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INTRODUCTION
The pursuit of nuclear disarmament has been a central component of the nu-
clear nonproliferation regime, starting with the initial signing of the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1968. The inclusion under Article VI of
the NPT of a commitment to “pursue negotiations in good faith on effective
measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and
to nuclear disarmament” reflected the desire of the non-nuclear-weapons states
(NNWS) not to create a regime that would allow nuclear-weapons states (NWS)
to retain their weapons in perpetuity. Governments in Washington, Moscow,
and London—representing the only three nuclear powers that signed the NPT
in 1968—insisted, however, that no precise standards and no time-bound guar-
antees about when disarmament would be achieved were possible. The interest
and emphasis given to nuclear disarmament by the leaders of the nuclear weap-
ons powers have waxed and waned throughout the history of the NPT, and for
much of the past decade, many governments in NNWS have complained that
the disarmament goal has been given short shrift by those with nuclear weapons.
Renewed interest in arms control and restated commitments to the long-
term goal of nuclear disarmament have clearly increased over recent years, most
dramatically with President Barack Obama’s April 2009 speech in Prague. With
that change in focus comes an opportunity for the international community to
rethink how Article VI of the NPT is traditionally interpreted and to move be-
yond the cycle of repeated complaints from the “have-nots” that the “haves”
are not doing enough to disarm themselves and repeated retorts by the “haves”
that they are already taking every step that is realistic or prudent. The promise
of a different approach to the commitments made under the NPT forms the
basis of the Scott Sagan’s valuable article—“Shared Responsibilities for Nuclear
Disarmament”—which was the concluding essay in the Fall 2009 special issue
of Daedalus that focused on the global nuclear future. Sagan’s paper, and its
call for rethinking the balance of responsibilities and the relationship between
different articles in the NPT, now provides the basis for a series of invited re-
sponse papers from seven distinguished authors. These international scholars
and diplomats present their interpretations of the commitments made under
the NPT regime and suggest new ways in which shared responsibilities for nu-
clear disarmament may or may not be realized in practice. Their contributions
serve to expand the discussion that was started by the original Daedalus article
—and together they are intended to spark renewed policy debates about how
best to pursue global disarmament, debates that will be prominent at the May
2010 NPT Review Conference in New York City and in the years following
that important meeting.
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SHARED RESPONSIBILITIES FOR NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT: A GLOBAL DEBATEvi
The distinguished authors in this American Academy of Arts and Sciences
Occasional Paper come from a diverse set of countries and reflect a diverse and
crosscutting set of perspectives on the disarmament debate. With respect to
nuclear arsenals, Scott Sagan (United States) and James Acton (United Kingdom)
are from NWS; Harald Müller (Germany), Jayantha Dhanapala (Sri Lanka),
Mustafa Kibaroglu (Turkey), Yukio Satoh (Japan), Mohamed Shaker (Egypt),
and Achilles Zaluar (Brazil) are leading specialists from NNWS. Three of these
states—Germany, Turkey, and Japan—are U.S. allies and come under extended
nuclear deterrence guarantees; Sri Lanka, Egypt, and Brazil, however, do not.
With respect to the use of nuclear energy today, Brazil, Germany, Japan, the
United States, and the United Kingdom all maintain nuclear power plants. Sri
Lanka, Egypt, and Turkey are aspirant nuclear energy states and have not yet
constructed the power plants that they hope to use in the future.
The differences in national perspectives and the differences in individual
opinions about appropriate disarmament steps among the authors should not
mask a commitment they all share. The contributors to this volume agree that
new thinking and continued debate about how best to maintain momentum
toward nuclear disarmament is to be welcomed. Only by seeking out, and tak-
ing into consideration, a cross section of views can progress toward the goal of 
a nuclear-weapons-free world continue. We hope that this Occasional Paper may
therefore serve as an important contribution to a global disarmament debate
that has become increasingly prominent over the past couple of years.
This Occasional Paper is part of the American Academy’s Global Nuclear
Future Initiative, which is guided by the Academy’s Committee on Interna-
tional Security Studies. The Initiative examines the safety, security, and non-
proliferation implications of the global spread of nuclear energy and is develop-
ing pragmatic recommendations for managing the emerging nuclear order.
The Global Nuclear Future Initiative is supported by generous grants from
Stephen D. Bechtel, Jr.; the S.D. Bechtel Foundation; the Carnegie Corpora-
tion of New York; the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation; the Alfred P.
Sloan Foundation; the Flora Family Foundation; and the Kavli Foundation.
We thank these funders for their support.
The Academy is grateful to the principal investigators of the Global Nuclear
Future Initiative—Steven E. Miller, Scott D. Sagan, Robert Rosner, and Thomas
Isaacs—along with expert members of the project’s advisory committee—John
W. Rowe, Richard A. Meserve, and Albert Carnesale—for contributing their
time, experience, and expertise to the work of the Initiative. We would also
like to thank the authors for bringing their knowledge and insight to bear on
these important issues.
Leslie Berlowitz
Chief Executive Officer and William T. Golden Chair
American Academy of Arts and Sciences
CHAPTER 1
Shared Responsibilities 
for Nuclear Disarmament
Scott D. Sagan
Interest in nuclear disarmament has grown rapidly in recent years.1 Starting with
the 2007 Wall Street Journal article by four former U.S. statesmen—George
Shultz, Henry Kissinger, William Perry, and Sam Nunn—and followed by en-
dorsements from similar sets of former leaders from the United Kingdom,
Germany, Poland, Australia, and Italy, the support for global nuclear disarma-
ment has spread.2 The Japanese and Australian governments announced the
creation of the International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and
Disarmament in June 2008. Both Senators John McCain and Barack Obama
explicitly supported the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons during the
2008 election campaign. In April 2009, at the London Summit, President
Barack Obama and President Dmitri Medvedev called for pragmatic U.S. and
Russian steps toward nuclear disarmament, and President Obama then dra-
matically reaffirmed “clearly and with conviction America’s commitment to
seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons” in his speech
in Prague. 
There is a simple explanation for these statements supporting nuclear dis-
armament: all states that have joined the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
(NPT) are committed “to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective mea-
sures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear
disarmament.” In the United States, moreover, under Clause 2 of Article 6 of
the Constitution, a treaty commitment is “the supreme Law of the Land.” To
1. This essay was first published in Daedalus 138 (4) (Fall 2009).
2. George P. Shultz, William J. Perry, Henry A. Kissinger, and Sam Nunn, “A World Free of
Nuclear Weapons,” The Wall Street Journal, January 4, 2007, and “Toward a Nuclear-Free
World,” The Wall Street Journal, January 15, 2008; Douglas Hurd, Malcolm Rifkind, David
Owen, and George Robinson, “Stop Worrying and Learn to Ditch the Bomb,” The Times
(London), June 30, 2008; Alexander Kwasnewski, Tadeusz Mazowieki, and Lech Walesa, “The
Vanishing Bomb,” The Moscow Times, April 7, 2009; Helmut Schmidt, Richard von Weizsacher,
Egon Bahr, and Hans-Dietrich Genscher, “Toward a Nuclear-Free World: A German View,”
International Herald Tribune, January 9, 2009; Massimo D’Alema, Gianfranco Fini, Giorgio
La Malfa, Arturo Parisi, and Francesco Calogero, “A World Free of Nuclear Weapons,” Corriere
Della Sera, July 24, 2008; Malcolm Fraser, Gustav Nossal, Barry Jones, Peter Gration, John
Sanderson, and Tilman Ruff, “Imagine There’s No Bomb,” The Age, April 8, 2009. 
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affirm the U.S. commitment to seek a world without nuclear weapons is there-
fore simply promising that the U.S. government will follow U.S. law. 
A closer reading of these various declarations, however, reveals both the
complexity of motives and the multiplicity of fears behind the current surge in
support of nuclear disarmament. Some declarations emphasize concerns that
the current behavior of nuclear-weapons states (NWS) signals to non-nuclear-
weapons states (NNWS) that they, too, will need nuclear weapons in the future
to meet their national security requirements. Other disarmament advocates
stress the growth of global terrorism and the need to reduce the number of
weapons and the amount of fissile material that could be stolen or sold to ter-
rorist groups. Some argue that the risk of nuclear weapons accidents or launch-
ing nuclear missiles on false warning cannot be entirely eliminated, despite sus-
tained efforts to do so, and thus believe that nuclear deterrence will inevitably
fail over time, especially if large arsenals are maintained and new nuclear states,
with weak command-and-control systems, emerge. 
Perhaps the most widespread motivation for disarmament is the belief that
future progress by the NWS to disarm will strongly influence the future will-
ingness of the NNWS to stay within the NPT. If this is true, then the choice
we face for the future is not between the current nuclear order of eight or nine
NWS and a nuclear-weapons-free world. Rather, the choice we face is between
moving toward a nuclear-weapons-free world or, to borrow Henry Rowen’s
phrase, “moving toward life in a nuclear armed crowd.”3
There are, of course, many critics of the nuclear disarmament vision. Some
critics focus on the problems of how to prevent nuclear weapons “breakout”
scenarios in a future world in which many more countries are “latent” NWS
because of the spread of uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing ca-
pabilities to meet the global demand for fuel for nuclear power reactors. Oth-
ers have expressed fears that deep nuclear arms reductions will inadvertently
lead to nuclear proliferation by encouraging U.S. allies currently living under
“the U.S. nuclear umbrella” of extended deterrence to pursue their own nu-
clear weapons for national security reasons. Other critics worry about the “in-
stability of small numbers” problem, fearing that conventional wars would
break out in a nuclear disarmed world, and that this risks a rapid nuclear rear-
mament race by former NWS that would lead to nuclear first use and victory
by the more prepared government. 
Some critics of disarmament falsely complain about nonexistent proposals
for U.S. unilateral disarmament. Frank Gaffney, for example, asserts that there
has been “a 17-year-long unilateral U.S. nuclear freeze” and claims that Presi-
dent Obama “stands to transform the ‘world’s only superpower’ into a nuclear
2 SHARED RESPONSIBILITIES FOR NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT: A GLOBAL DEBATE
3. See Albert Wohlstetter, Thomas A. Brown, Gregory Jones, David McGarvey, Henry Rowen,
Vincent Taylor, and Roberta Wohlstetter, “Moving Toward Life in a Nuclear Armed Crowd?”
Report for the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, April 22, 1976; http://www.npec-web
.org/Frameset.asp?PageType=Single&PDFFile=19751204-AW-EtAl-MovingTowardsLife
NuclearArmedCrowd&PDFFolder=Essays.
impotent.”4 More serious critics focus on those problems—the growth and
potential breakout of latent NWS, the future of extended deterrence, the en-
forcement of disarmament, and the potential instability of small numbers—
that concern mutual nuclear disarmament. These legitimate concerns must be
addressed in a credible manner if significant progress is to be made toward the
goal of a nuclear-weapons-free world.
To address these problems adequately, the current nuclear disarmament
effort must be transformed from a debate among leaders in the NWS to a co-
ordinated global effort of shared responsibilities between NWS and NNWS.
This essay outlines a new conceptual framework that is needed to encourage
NWS and NNWS to share responsibilities for designing a future nuclear-fuel-
cycle regime, rethinking extended deterrence, and addressing nuclear break-
out dangers while simultaneously contributing to the eventual elimination of
nuclear weapons. 
The NPT is often described as a grand bargain between NWS and NNWS.
The NNWS, it is said, agreed not to acquire nuclear weapons in exchange for
the “inalienable right,” under Article IV of the Treaty, to acquire civilian nu-
clear power technology under international nonproliferation safeguards and
the promise by the NWS, under Article VI of the Treaty, to work in good faith
to eliminate eventually all of their nuclear weapons. Wolfgang Panofsky, for
example, argued:
Non-nuclear Weapons States were enjoined from acquiring nuclear weap-
ons and Nuclear Weapons States were forbidden to transfer nuclear weap-
ons and the wherewithal to make them to an NNWS. To compensate for
this obvious discriminatory division of the world’s nations, NNWS were
assured that they had an “inalienable right” to the peaceful application of
nuclear energy, and the NWS obligated themselves in Article VI of the
treaty to work in good faith toward nuclear disarmament.5
In his 2009 Prague speech, President Obama similarly maintained that
“the basic bargain is sound: Countries with nuclear weapons will move to-
wards disarmament, countries without nuclear weapons will not acquire them,
and all countries can access peaceful nuclear energy.” 
These statements correctly highlight the important linkage between nu-
clear disarmament and nuclear nonproliferation. But framing the linkage in
this way—with NWS seen as responsible for disarmament and NNWS respon-
sible for accepting nonproliferation safeguards on their nuclear power programs
—is historically inaccurate and politically unfortunate. It is historically inaccu-
rate because both Article IV and Article VI were written to apply to both the
3
4. Frank Gaffney, Jr., “Peace Through Weakness,” February 16, 2009; http://www.center
for securitypolicy.org/p17891.xml?cat_id=120. 
5. Wolfgang K. H. Panofsky, “The Nonproliferation Regime under Siege,” Bulletin of the
Atomic Scientists (August 5, 2007); http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/op-eds/the
-nonproliferation-regime-under-siege.
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NWS and the NNWS. This common description of the Treaty is unfortu-
nate because it limits the prospects for crafting a more comprehensive and more
equitable implementation of the basic NPT bargains, based on shared respon-
sibilities between NWS and NNWS, in the future. 
Article IV of the NPT simply states, “Nothing in this Treaty shall be in-
terpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to
develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes
without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of this Treaty.”
The expected global expansion of nuclear power, however, will lead to increas-
ing demand for enriched uranium and reprocessed plutonium around the globe;
a crucial question for future security therefore is whether the spread of nuclear
power will lead to the spread of enrichment and plutonium fuel-production
facilities. Mohamed ElBaradei has been particularly forceful in warning of the
security risks inherent in such a world of multiple “virtual nuclear weapons
states,” arguing for “a new international or multinational approach to the fuel
cycle so as to avoid ending up with not just nine nuclear weapon States but
another 20 or 30 States which have the capacity to develop nuclear weapons
in a very short span of time.”6 George Perkovich and James Acton agree, not-
ing that the NWS are unlikely to take the final steps toward complete disar-
mament if there are many states that could quickly get nuclear weapons mate-
rial from their own national uranium or plutonium production facilities. “If
no acceptable form of regulation can be established for the proliferation-sen-
sitive activities that many states which today promote disarmament are seek-
ing to conduct,” they argue, “the abolition of nuclear weapons may not prove
possible.”7
Many proposals exist for different forms of multinational fuel-cycle facili-
ties (plants owned and operated by multiple states) or international facilities
(plants owned and operated by an international organization). Governments
of many NNWS, however, as well as some nuclear technology exporters, argue
that creating any constraints on the national production of nuclear fuels would
violate the “inalienable right” mentioned in Article IV. As Albert Wohlstetter
once noted, it is as if some diplomats believe that all states have “a new natu-
ral right to Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Plutonium.”8
Three important points about Article IV become clearer if one probes a
little more deeply. First, this “inalienable right” is in reality a conditional right,
dependent upon the state in question being “in conformity” with Articles I
and II of the NPT. It is too often forgotten in the debate over the Iranian nu-
clear program, for example, that a state that is not behaving “in conformity”
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6. Mohamed ElBaradei, “Addressing Verification Challenges,” Statements of the Director
General: Symposium on International Safeguards, October 16, 2006; http://www.iaea.org/
NewsCenter/Statements/2006/ebsp2006n018.html.
7. George Perkovich and James M. Acton, “Abolishing Nuclear Weapons,” Adelphi Paper 396
(London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2008), 93.
8. Albert Wohlstetter, “Spreading the Bomb without Quite Breaking the Rules,” Foreign Policy
(Winter 1976/1977). 
with its Article II commitment “not to seek or receive any assistance in the
manufacture of nuclear weapons” has at least temporarily sacrificed its rights
to acquire civilian nuclear technology under Article IV. The Board of Gover-
nors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) decides whether or
not a state is in compliance with its specific safeguards commitments. But the
IAEA does not determine the appropriate response to a safeguards violation
that is not remedied in a timely fashion; instead, it reports any such case of
noncompliance to the UN Security Council and the General Assembly—as it
did in 2004 with respect to Libya and in 2006 with respect to Iran—and then
the Security Council must decide on appropriate responses.9
Second, Article IV refers to “all the Parties to the Treaty,” not just the
NNWS. This should lead to increased opportunities to share responsibility for
nonproliferation and disarmament, for it suggests that as part of their Article
IV commitment, the NWS should reaffirm that international safeguards can
eventually be placed on all of their nuclear power plants and enrichment and
reprocessing facilities. Indeed, such an agreement in principle, with an excep-
tion for facilities with “direct national security significance,” was in fact made
by President Lyndon Johnson in 1967, as a major compromise during the NPT
negotiations.10 Reaffirming this commitment, as a responsibility under Article
IV, should be easy to accept in principle; after all, if NWS are committed to
working in good faith toward nuclear disarmament, at some point they would
become, to coin an acronym, FNWS (former nuclear-weapons states), and the
safeguard exceptions they currently maintain would no longer apply. 
In practice, it would be helpful for NWS to go beyond reaffirmations and
expressions of principle and pick one or more model facilities to place under
advanced safeguards, to demonstrate future intentions and help create best
practices. Strict safeguards on existing nuclear-fuel production facilities in the
NWS are not really necessary today to ensure that the materials from the plants
are not diverted for nuclear weapons, since NWS already have sufficient fissile
materials from their military nuclear production programs. But placing new
facilities under IAEA safeguards would signal equitable treatment and a long-
term commitment to disarmament. Similar safeguards will also be needed if a
Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT), ending the production of materials
for weapons, is successfully negotiated, though in this case the verification and
safeguarding functions would be best handled (at least initially) by a new or-
ganization of inspectors from NWS, rather than the IAEA, so as to limit ac-
cess into sensitive former weapons-material production facilities.
Third, responsibilities for sharing the financial support of IAEA interna-
tional safeguards can be improved. Today, each IAEA member state pays into
a regular budget of the Agency, from which the Safeguards Division draws
funds for its inspection programs; but the Agency is strapped for funds to deal
9. Pierre Goldschmidt, “Exposing Nuclear Non-Compliance,” Survival 51 (1) (2009): 143–164.
10. See George Bunn, Arms Control by Committee (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press,
1992), 101.
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with the current level of inspections, and will be much more so if nuclear
power continues to expand as expected and if the more intrusive regime re-
quired by the Agreed Protocol, which calls for advanced inspections, comes
into force. One approach that has been advocated is to have states pay more
into the IAEA safeguards budget in proportion to the number and kinds of
facilities they have on their soil that are subject to inspection. This approach,
however, places the financial burden only on the state that benefits from the
nuclear power plant or fuel facility in question and ignores that the nonprolif-
eration benefits of the safeguards are shared by all states. A better approach
would be to have all governments—both NWS and NNWS, and both states
with nuclear power programs and those without nuclear power—substantially
increase their funding support for the IAEA, to enhance its future safeguards
capabilities. Indeed, it would be possible to have private industry and even
philanthropic organizations interested in promoting more safe and secure use
of nuclear power also contribute to the IAEA safeguards budget.11
Article VI of the NPT states in full, “Each of the Parties to the Treaty
undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating
to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarma-
ment, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and
effective international control.” Many diplomats from NNWS have complained
at virtually every NPT review conference that the NWS have not done enough
to meet their disarmament commitments, and the May 2009 NPT Prepara-
tory Committee meeting was not unusual in that regard. The NNWS com-
plaints are not without some merit, for the recent Bush administration did
not follow through on some of the disarmament-related commitments (most
specifically, seeking ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty) that
previous administrations had made at NPT review conferences.12 In addition,
some former U.S. government officials have unhelpfully claimed that the
United States never really intended to keep its Article VI commitments. For-
mer CIA Director John Deutch, for example, asserted in Foreign Affairs in 2005
that Washington was “unwise” “to commit under Article 6 of the Nonprolif-
eration Treaty [NPT] ‘to pursue good-faith negotiations’ toward complete
disarmament, a goal it has no intention of pursuing.”13 The Bush administra-
tion’s 2001 U.S. Nuclear Posture Review was also widely interpreted to signal
movement away from the NPT commitment to nuclear disarmament because
the document declared that U.S. nuclear weapons “possess unique capabilities
11. For creative ideas on increasing the size and diversity of IAEA contributions, see Thomas
Shea, “Financing IAEA Verification of the NPT,” November 2006; http://www.npec-web.org/
Essays/20061113-Shea-FinancingIAEAVerification.pdf.
12. For differing views on this, see Christopher A. Ford, “Debating Disarmament: Interpreting
Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,” The Nonproliferation
Review 14 (3) (2007): 402–428, and Scott D. Sagan, “Good Faith and Nuclear Disarmament
Negotiations,” in Abolishing Nuclear Weapons: A Debate, ed. George Perkovich and James M.
Acton (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2009), 203–212.
13. John Deutch, “A Nuclear Posture for Today,” Foreign Affairs (January–February 2005): 51.
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. . . to hold at risk targets [that are] important to achieve strategic and politi-
cal objectives”; it called for the development of new nuclear warheads; and it
outlined a strategy of “dissuasion,” the policy of maintaining such a large ad-
vantage in military forces, including nuclear, that other states would be dis-
suaded from even considering entering into a military arms competition with
the United States. 
Many diplomats and scholars have spoken about the specific arms-control
and disarmament steps the United States and other NWS could take to demon-
strate that they are pursuing their Article VI commitments more seriously. Miss-
ing from this debate is a discussion of what the NNWS can do to help in the
disarmament process. Looking at shared responsibilities points to two specific
ways in which the NNWS can better honor their Article VI commitments. 
First, just as NWS and NNWS should share responsibilities for funding the
increasingly advanced international safeguards necessary for nuclear power fa-
cilities, the NWS and NWS should both contribute significantly to funding
the necessary major research and development effort for improved monitor-
ing and verification technologies that will be needed if nuclear disarmament is
to progress to very low numbers of weapons. In October 2008, the British
government invited the governments of the other NPT-recognized nuclear
states—the United States, Russia, France, and China—to participate in a major
technical conference examining future verification challenges and opportuni-
ties. Even more importantly, the British government recognized that R&D
for disarmament verification must not occur in “splendid isolation,” and so
jointly sponsored test programs with the Norwegian government laboratories
to identify promising technologies that would permit Norway and other NNWS
to be more directly involved in implementing and monitoring future global
nuclear disarmament.14
Second, focusing on shared responsibilities helps identify a more direct
and stronger linkage between Article VI and Article IV of the NPT. Because
NWS will be less likely to accept deep reductions to zero (or close to zero) if
there are more and more states with latent nuclear-weapons capability because
of the spread of uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing technologies,
NNWS have both an individual interest and a collective responsibility to make
sure that constraints are placed on sensitive fuel-cycle facilities. In short, the
NNWS should recognize that entering into negotiations about international
control of the nuclear fuel cycle is an essential part of their Article VI commit-
ment “to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to
cessation of the nuclear arms race.” 
A third common criticism of the disarmament goal is that nuclear force
reductions might backfire, inadvertently encouraging nuclear proliferation, by
undercutting U.S. extended deterrent commitments. In September 2008, for
14. Des Brown, “Laying the Foundation for Multilateral Disarmament,” February 5, 2008;
http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/cd/speeches08/1session/Feb5UKDefSecDes
Brown.pdf.
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example, Secretary of Energy Samuel Bodman and Secretary of Defense Robert
Gates declared that “the United States will need to maintain a nuclear force . . .
for the foreseeable future,” basing this position in part on the need to protect
U.S. non-nuclear allies: 
The role nuclear forces play in the deterrence of attack against allies re-
mains an essential instrument of U.S. nonproliferation policy by signifi-
cantly reducing the incentives for a number of allied countries to acquire
nuclear weapons for their own. . . . In the absence of this “nuclear um-
brella,” some non-nuclear allies might perceive a need to develop and de-
ploy their own nuclear capability.15
The term “nuclear umbrella,” however, should be deleted from the stra-
tegic lexicon used by government officials and scholars alike. It connotes a
defensive, passive strategy—as if Japan, South Korea, and NATO countries were
protected by some kind of missile defense shield—rather than the threat of re-
taliation with nuclear weapons against a state that attacks a U.S. ally. Even
more importantly, the nuclear umbrella term does not differentiate between
two very different kinds of extended deterrence policies: a U.S. commitment
to use nuclear weapons first, if necessary, to defend an ally if it is attacked by
an enemy who uses conventional forces, biological or chemical weapons, or
nuclear weapons; and a more tailored U.S. commitment to use U.S. nuclear
weapons in retaliation against only a nuclear attack on an ally. The first form
of extended deterrence was the U.S. Cold War policy in NATO and in East
Asia and remains largely intact today despite the end of the Cold War. 
Adopting the second form of extended deterrence—maintaining commit-
ments to joint defense but limiting the threat of nuclear weapons use to retal-
iation against nuclear attacks on allies—would not necessarily lead to the nu-
clear proliferation cascade that Gates and Bodman seem to fear. Indeed, a more
targeted U.S. nuclear guarantee, if implemented properly after alliance con-
sultation, could have a number of positive strategic effects. First, such a change
might be welcomed by those allies who continue to value allied conventional
military commitments, but feel that first-use nuclear threats encourage nuclear
proliferation elsewhere in the world. A more targeted nuclear guarantee would
also make U.S. nuclear weapons doctrine consistent with Negative Security
Assurances (NSAs)—commitments not to use nuclear weapons against NNWS
—which all five NPT-recognized NWS have made at past NPT review con-
ferences and at the UN Security Council in 1995. In addition, abandoning U.S.
threats to use nuclear weapons in response to another state using chemical or
biological weapons against the United States or our allies could be followed
by more credible deterrent threats to respond with devastating conventional
military retaliation, and with a commitment to isolate and overthrow any leader
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15. Samuel W. Bodman and Robert M. Gates, “National Security and Nuclear Weapons in the
21st Century,” September 2008; http://www.defenselink.mil/news/nuclearweaponspolicy.pdf. 
who uses outlawed chemical or biological weapons. Finally, limiting the role
of U.S. nuclear weapons to deterrence of other states’ use of nuclear weapons
would signal strong support for the eventual elimination of all nuclear weapons,
for if such a no-first-use nuclear doctrine became universally accepted, the ex-
isting NWS could more easily coordinate moving in tandem to lower and equal
levels of nuclear weapons on the road to zero. 
Such a change in U.S. and other powers’ nuclear doctrine will not be eas-
ily accepted by all allies, nor will it be easy to implement within military estab-
lishments. NATO official doctrine, for example, which has not been revised since
1999, continues to assert (though it does not prove) that nuclear weapons re-
main critical for a variety of threat scenarios: “[T]he Alliance’s conventional
forces alone cannot ensure credible deterrence. Nuclear weapons make a unique
contribution in rendering the risks of aggression against the Alliance incalcu-
lable and unacceptable. Thus, they remain essential to preserve peace.”16 In-
terest in maintaining an expansive form of extended deterrence remains strong
in East Asia as well. Ambassador Yukio Satoh, for example, correctly notes that
the Japanese government’s official “Defense Program Outline” states only
that “to protect its territory and people against the threat of nuclear weapons,
Japan will continue to rely on the U.S. nuclear deterrent”; but Satoh has also
recommended that the United States should now threaten to retaliate with
nuclear weapons if North Korea uses chemical or biological weapons in any
future conflict.17
The major responsibility for reducing the roles and missions that nuclear
weapons play in the doctrines of the nuclear powers clearly falls on the gov-
ernments of those nations. President Obama called for precisely such doctri-
nal change in his 2009 Prague speech, promising that “to put an end to Cold
War thinking, we will reduce the role of nuclear weapons in our national secu-
rity strategy.” This will require that U.S. politicians and military officers stop
leaning on the crutch of nuclear weapons to shore up deterrence, even in situ-
ations in which the credibility of such threats is vanishingly thin. During the
2008 U.S. election primary campaign, for example, Senators Hillary Clinton
and Christopher Dodd both criticized then Senator Obama for saying that he
would not consider using U.S. nuclear weapons to attack al Qaeda targets in-
side Pakistan (a U.S. ally), arguing, in Clinton’s words, “I don’t believe that
any president should make any blanket statements with respect to the use or
non-use of nuclear weapons.”18 In May 2009, General Kevin Chilton, the
commander of the U.S. Strategic Command, took the “all options are on the
16. “The Alliance’s Strategic Concept” (NATO, April 1999); http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/
1999/p99-065e.htm.
17. See “Are the Requirements for Extended Deterrence Changing?” Carnegie Endowment
for International Peace Conference, April 6, 2009; transcript available at http://www.carnegie
endowment.org/events/?fa=eventDetail&id=1299.
18. Reuters, “Obama, Clinton in New Flap over Nuclear Weapons,” August 2, 2007; http://
www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/N02381100.htm.
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table” argument to a new level, threatening U.S. nuclear retaliation in response
to cyber attacks: “I think you don’t take any response options off the table
from an attack on the United States of America. . . . And I don’t see any rea-
son to treat cyber any differently. I mean, why would we tie the president’s
hands?”19
While the United States and other NWS should take the first steps to re-
duce their reliance on nuclear weapons, there is much that NNWS can do to
encourage and enable new nuclear doctrines to be adopted, in the spirit of
shared responsibilities for nuclear disarmament. First, NNWS that are mem-
bers of U.S. alliances can stop asking to be reassured about noncredible mili-
tary options. This is not a new problem. Indeed, although the global strategic
context is different, Henry Kissinger alluded to a similar dynamic when he ad-
monished the NATO alliance back in 1979: 
We must face the fact that it is absurd to base the strategy of the West on
the credibility of the threat of mutual suicide. . . . Don’t you Europeans
keep asking us to multiply assurances that we cannot possibly mean; and
that if we mean them, we should not want to execute; and that if we ex-
ecute, we’ll destroy civilization. That is our strategic dilemma, into which
we have built ourselves by our own theory and by the encouragement of
our allies.20
Second, it would be helpful if the NNWS that are not members of U.S.
alliances would spend as much time condemning states that are caught violat-
ing their commitments not to develop chemical or biological weapons as they
do complaining that the NSAs offered at the NPT review conferences should
be legally binding. Finally, those U.S. allies that remain concerned about con-
ventional or chemical and biological threats to their national security should,
as part of their Article VI disarmament commitment, help to develop the con-
ventional forces and defensive systems that could wean themselves away from
excessive reliance on U.S. nuclear weapons for extended deterrence.21
The final argument against nuclear disarmament concerns breakout sce-
narios and the challenge of enforcement. Harold Brown and John Deutch,
for example, have argued that “[p]roliferating states, even if they abandoned
these devices under resolute international pressure, would still be able to clan-
destinely retain a few of their existing weapons—or maintain a standby, break-
out capability to acquire a few weapons quickly, if needed.”22 The breakout
problem, however, applies to both new potential proliferators and former
19. Elaine M. Grossman, “U.S. General Reserves Right to Use Force, Even Nuclear, in Response
to Cyber Attack,” Global Security Newswire, May 12, 2009; http://gsn.nti.org/gsn/nw_
20090512_4977.php.
20. “Kissinger on NATO,” Time, September 17, 1979; http://www.time.com/time/magazine/
article/0,9171,920653,00.html. 
21. George Perkovich, “Extended Deterrence,” Draft Paper Prepared for the Evans-Kawaguchi
Commission, May 2009. 
22. Harold Brown and John Deutch, “The Nuclear Disarmament Fantasy,” The Wall Street
Journal, November 19, 2007.
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NWS that have disarmed in a nuclear-free world. Thomas Schelling and Charles
Glaser have made similar arguments about “the instability of small numbers,”
fearing nuclear use would be more likely at the final stages of disarmament or
after nuclear disarmament occurs, because states would engage in arms races
to get nuclear weapons in any subsequent crisis and the winner in any such
arms race would use its nuclear weapons with less fear of nuclear retaliation.23
These are legitimate concerns, and addressing the challenges of verifica-
tion and enforcement of disarmament should be a high priority for future dis-
armament efforts. How can a vision of shared responsibility between the NWS
and NNWS help address these vexing problems? First, NWS and NNWS should
work together to punish the violators of currently existing nonproliferation
agreements. North Korea violated its NPT commitments by secretly taking
nuclear material out of the Yongbyon reactor complex in the 1990s and by
covertly starting a uranium enrichment program with the assistance of Pak-
istan. Iran similarly was caught in violation of its NPT safeguards agreement
in 2002, when the covert Natanz enrichment facility was discovered and evi-
dence of nuclear-weapons-related research was later released by the U.S. intel-
ligence community. Finally, Syria was caught violating its NPT commitments
in 2007, when Israeli intelligence discovered a covert nuclear reactor under
construction. More consistent pressure by all five permanent members of the
UN Security Council (the P5 are the United States, Russia, China, France, and
the United Kingdom) should be matched by more uniform support by the
NNWS at the IAEA and in the UN Security Council to create stronger resolu-
tions condemning these violations and imposing sanctions on the violators.
Such a display of shared responsibilities would both help resolve these prolif-
eration crises and set better precedents for future challenges. 
Second, the NNWS and NWS need to work together more effectively to
reduce the risks of nuclear weapons breakout in the future. To help deter with-
drawal from the NPT, the UN Security Council could adopt a binding resolu-
tion stating that it would consider any case in which a state withdraws from
the NPT, after being found to be in noncompliance with its safeguards agree-
ments, to constitute a threat to international peace and security under the UN
charter. The Nuclear Suppliers Group and the IAEA could also discourage fu-
ture withdrawals from the NPT by making all future sales of sensitive nuclear
facilities subject to safeguards agreements that do not lapse if a state withdraws
from the NPT and including a “return to sender” clause in which the recipient
state would be required to close down the facilities and return the sensitive
technology and nuclear materials to the country of origin as soon as possible.24
11
23. See Thomas C. Schelling’s essay “A world without nuclear weapons?” in Daedalus 138 (4)
(Fall 2009) as well as Schelling, “The Role of Deterrence in Total Disarmament,” Foreign Af-
fairs (April 1962). See also, Charles Glaser, “The Instability of Small Numbers Revisited,” in Re-
building the NPT Consensus, ed. Michael May (Stanford, Calif.: Center for International Security
and Cooperation, 2008); http://iis-db.stanford.edu/pubs/22218/RebuildNPTConsensus.pdf.
24. See Pierre Goldschmidt, “Concrete Steps to Improve the Nonproliferation Regime,” Non-
proliferation Program Paper 100 (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace, April 2009).
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It is often forgotten, however, that there is a logical link between Article
VI and Article X of the NPT. It will be difficult for the existing NWS to take
the final steps of nuclear disarmament without more confidence that NNWS
will not withdraw from the Treaty in the future. It will also be difficult for the
NNWS to accept constraints on their Article X rights without more confidence
that the existing nuclear powers will actually implement disarmament in ways
that are difficult for them to reverse. At future NPT review conferences, the
NWS and NNWS should therefore address how best to promote increased ver-
ification and transparency and to reduce incentives for NPT withdrawal and
disarmament reversal as part of their joint responsibilities to work in good faith
toward a nuclear-free world. 
Efforts to prevent cheating on NPT commitments or future disarmament
agreements may fail, of course, and stronger enforcement mechanisms there-
fore need to be considered. There are, fortunately, strong logical reasons to be
optimistic about the prospects for enforcement in a nuclear-free world: in such
a world, the major powers, which would include both traditional NNWS and
new former NWS, would take violations more seriously because small-scale
cheating would pose an even greater risk to their security than is the case now.
Today, the existence of large arsenals in the United States and Russia, and ar-
guably in other NWS as well, encourages some leaders to be complacent about
the spread of nuclear weapons to new nations. Faith in the strength of nuclear
deterrence leads some policy-makers to believe that North Korea or Iran, for
example, will be deterred from ever using their nuclear weapons if the current
negotiations fail. In a nuclear-free world, however, such deterrence optimism
would be far less likely, and all major powers would share deeper fears of the
emergence of new nuclear states.25 The temptation for buck-passing would
remain, but the faith that nuclear deterrence would constrain a violator would
not, and new institutional arrangements for coordinating decision-making on
sanctions and conventional military operations, perhaps through the UN Secu-
rity Council, could help produce more effective enforcement of nonprolifera-
tion and disarmament. 
Finally, it should be noted that in a nuclear-weapons-free world, former
NWS will retain the option of withdrawing from any disarmament agreement.
The possibility of rearmament, however, is both a potential problem for sta-
bility, if a conventional war or deep crisis occurs between two latent nuclear
states, and a potential source of stability, for each latent nuclear state will know
that if it rushes to rearm, others may do so as well. “Irreversibility” is often
cited as a key objective in any nuclear disarmament agreement (for example,
this goal was cited in the 13 Practical Steps agreed to at the 2000 NPT Re-
view Conference). Yet in a world without nuclear weapons, the former NWS
would be “more latent” than others who did not have their technological ex-
pertise or operational experience, and an objective in the final negotiations in
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25. This argument was first made by Charles L. Glaser, “The Flawed Case for Nuclear Disar-
mament,” Survival 40 (1) (Spring 1998). 
the global disarmament process must be to create stronger verification and
monitoring capabilities to provide confidence that one state could not start
the rearmament process without others observing such actions. Nuclear de-
terrence would still exist in a nuclear-weapons-free world, but it would be of 
a much more recessed and latent form than exists today. 
Some are pessimistic about the prospects for latent nuclear deterrence,
believing that it is inherently less stable than the current form of active nu-
clear deterrence. Sir Michael Quinlan, for example, argued that “it is some-
times suggested that the very fact of this reconstitution risk would serve as a
deterrent to war—weaponless deterrence, it has been called, a sort of deter-
rence at one remove. But that implies a worldwide and long-sighted wisdom
on which it would surely be imprudent to count.”26 Quinlan was certainly
correct to remain skeptical about the degree we can ensure that “worldwide
and long-sighted wisdom” will exist in the future world without nuclear
weapons. But surely the same argument holds true, and in spades, for a future
world with many states holding nuclear arsenals. We cannot design an interna-
tional system in which wisdom and prudence are guaranteed. A nuclear-free
world would, however, reduce the consequences of individual failures of wis-
dom and prudence.
The technical and political challenges that confront proponents of nuclear
disarmament are complex and serious. It is therefore by no means clear that
the NWS will be able to overcome these challenges to achieve the goal of
complete nuclear disarmament. What is clear, though, is that the existing
NWS cannot reach the summit of a nuclear-free world without the active
partnership of the current NNWS. The NWS and NWS have a shared respon-
sibility for nuclear disarmament in the future, and will share a common fate 
if they fail to cooperate more effectively.
13
26. Michael Quinlan, “Abolishing Nuclear Armouries: Policy or Pipedream?” Survival 49 (2)
(Winter 2007–2008): 12.
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The opening words of Article VI of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
(NPT), “Each of the Parties to the Treaty,” are frequently ignored. At first
blush, it seems almost counterintuitive to suggest that the abolition of nuclear
weapons is anything other than the responsibility of the states that possess
them. Yet, if disarmament is viewed as more than just the mechanics of verifi-
ably eliminating weapons—if it is viewed as the effort to create the conditions
that would make a world without nuclear weapons more secure than a world
with them—then those words must be taken seriously. Disarmament has to
become, as Scott Sagan argues, a shared responsibility. 
Shared responsibility, however, does not mean equal responsibility. Nuclear-
weapons states (NWS) can and should lead the process. They can and should
take steps toward abolition, such as deep cuts in their arsenals, regardless of
whether non-nuclear-weapons states (NNWS) play a constructive role. But
abolition will not be possible through the efforts of the NWS alone. There
are some security concerns—such as preventing proliferation and managing
breakout—that require the participation of NNWS. 
Sagan argues that NNWS allied to the United States could play a special
role in helping to shape U.S. nuclear doctrine. I agree with him. U.S. allies
can make it politically feasible for the United States to work toward abolition.
It is hard to overstate the degree to which extended deterrence shapes
the debate in Washington about nuclear deterrence. The United States finds
it increasingly untenable to argue that, for its own defense, it needs an arsenal
nearly as large or diverse as its current one or a doctrine so permissive that it
reserves the right, for example, to respond to a chemical attack with nuclear
weapons.1 And although some try to defend the current U.S. force posture,
or something not too dissimilar, on the grounds of self-defense, most have
CHAPTER 2
U.S. Allies and the Politics of
Abolishing Nuclear Weapons 
James M. Acton
1. For the argument that the United States needs a more diverse and flexible arsenal to ensure
the continued relevance of nuclear deterrence in protecting U.S. interests see Keith Payne,
“How Much is Enough?: A Goal-Driven Approach to Defining Key Principles,” Third Annual
Conference on Strategic Weapons in the 21st Century, Washington, D.C., January 29, 2009,
http://www.lanl.gov/conferences/sw/2009/docs/payne_livermore-2.pdf.
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shifted their focus to U.S. allies.2 At issue is not whether U.S. allies are effec-
tively protected, but whether they believe they are. In U.S. strategic thinking,
assuring allies is a task in its own right, and as experience has shown, it is much
harder than successfully deterring their enemies. Assurance is also probably
the single most important factor in determining the U.S. force posture—as
the ongoing Nuclear Posture Review has made clear.
Perhaps the most bizarre debate within the Nuclear Posture Review has
concerned the future of the nuclear-armed variant of the Tomahawk Land
Attack Missile (TLAM/N).3 For the last nineteen years, the entire TLAM/N
force, which was designed to be deployed on submarines, has been kept in
land-based storage. Not only is it an outdated system that no longer fills a
military niche, but it is probably too unreliable to use.4 Unsurprisingly, the
U.S. Navy is arguing that the system should be dismantled in order to free 
up the resources currently expended on keeping it in permanent hibernation.
TLAM/N has strong supporters, however, both inside and outside govern-
ment, who argue that it is vital to assuring Japan. Indeed, senior Japanese 
officials apparently voiced this sentiment to the congressionally mandated
Strategic Posture Commission, which issued its final report in May 2009.5
At the time of writing, the Nuclear Posture Review has not yet been
completed, and the outcome of the TLAM/N debate is unknown. The fact
that the United States is seriously considering not abandoning an obsolete
and militarily redundant system, however, is testament to the importance of
assuring allies. Assurance is also considered the most cogent argument against
significant doctrinal changes, and it is an important argument against deep
cuts. It is even invoked as a reason against U.S. ratification of the Compre-
hensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) on the grounds that a permanent foreclos-
ing of the option to test might cause allies to lose confidence in the U.S.
deterrent (it bears emphasizing, however, that few, if any, in President Barack
Obama’s administration share this view and that all U.S. allies advocate CTBT
ratification).6
2. See, for example, Melanie Kirkpatrick, “Why We Don’t Want a Nuclear-Free World: The For-
mer Defense Secretary on the U.S. Deterrent and the Terrorist Threat,” The Wall Street Journal,
July 13, 2009, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124726489588925407.html; for a more
thoughtful exploration see Clark A. Murdoch et al., Exploring the Nuclear Posture Implications
of Extended Deterrence and Assurance: Workshop Proceeding and Key Takeaways (Washington,
D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2009), http://csis.org/files/publication/
091218_nuclear_posture.pdf.
3. For a more detailed description of this debate see James M. Acton, “Extended Deterrence and
Communicating Resolve,” Strategic Insights VIII (5) (December 2009), http://www.nps.edu/
Academics/centers/ccc/publications/OnlineJournal/2009/Dec/actonDec09.html. 
4. Jeffrey Lewis, “A Problem With the Nuclear Tomahawk,” New America Foundation, De-
cember 1, 2009, http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/file_download/215/Tomahawk2.pdf. 
5. William J. Perry et al., America’s Strategic Posture: The Final Report of the Congressional Com-
mission on the Strategic Posture of the United States (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of
Peace Press, 2009), 26, http://www.usip.org/files/America’s_Strategic_Posture_Auth_Ed.pdf.
6. See, for example, John Kyl, “Why We Need to Test Nuclear Weapons,” The Wall Street Journal,
October 20, 2009, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704500604574483224
117732120.html. 
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U.S. allies can help undercut this series of arguments. A large part of the
challenge for them is to realize that, logically, what deters their enemies ought
to be enough to assure them. They then need to engage with the United
States to encourage it not to retain, for the sake of assurance, capabilities or
operational plans that are unnecessary for deterrence. 
The politics of the NPT Review Process is, ironically, not conducive to
serious disarmament efforts. As much as extended deterrence is a pervasive
concern of those responsible for U.S. nuclear weapons, it is ignored in NPT
forums. The discussion of deterrence—extended or central—is practically ver-
boten.
Observing this omission, international relations scholar William
Walker has argued that
precisely because the NPT is a disarmament treaty, the Treaty and its
Conferences can neither ascribe value to nuclear deterrence nor counte-
nance discussion of it, irrespective of the importance that leading powers
and their allies attach to it, and irrespective of the role that it might play
in paving the way for deep arms reductions or disarmament. To pay open
homage to nuclear deterrence is to jeopardize the non-proliferation norm
and regime. Nuclear deterrence is always the ghost at the table whose
presence is understood but whose contribution to regional and global
security cannot openly be acknowledged or weighed.7
If the NPT Review Conference is to be more than a purely reactive body
that, once in every two or so tries, can agree to recognize half-hearted progress
and identify a few relatively uncontroversial next steps, and instead proactively
charts a course toward a world without nuclear weapons, it must be able to
discuss nuclear deterrence. Although nuclear weapons may not play as large
or important a role as some critics of the abolition agenda suggest, they are a
stabilizing factor in international relations. This point was made, refreshingly,
in the final report of the International Commission on Nuclear Non-Prolifer-
ation and Disarmament. Although rejecting some of the dogma of nuclear
deterrence, it did recognize that “it is hard to contest the almost universally
held view that the absence of great power conflict since 1945 must be at least
in part attributed to the fear of nuclear war.”8 Without making a similar ac-
knowledgment, the NPT Review Conference is not able to recognize the need
to develop alternatives to nuclear deterrence, let alone make progress toward
actually doing so.
There is a second, more political, reason why it would be useful for the
NPT Review Conference to acknowledge and discuss nuclear deterrence. The
7. William Walker, “International Nuclear Order: A Rejoinder,” International Affairs 83 (4)
(July 2007): 752. 
8. Eliminating Nuclear Threats: A Practical Agenda for Global Policymakers (Canberra: Interna-
tional Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, 2009), 61, http://www.icnnd
.org/reference/reports/ent/pdf/ICNND_Report-EliminatingNuclearThreats.pdf. 
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NWS sometimes complain (with some truth) that the progress they have al-
ready made toward disarmament has not been recognized.9 If Russia and the
United States were to make deeper cuts, then, according to one line of reason-
ing, they might find themselves under increasing pressure to finish the job and
eliminate their remaining nuclear weapons regardless of whether the conditions
that would make it safe to do so had been established. In this scenario, NPT
politics could become more poisonous and divisive than they are today. If the
Review Conference could recognize the role played by nuclear deterrence, it
could acknowledge that going from low numbers to zero is a much greater
challenge than reducing from current levels to low numbers. In turn, this could
increase the willingness of Russia and the United States to make deep cuts.
NNWS allied to the United States have an important role to play in help-
ing the NPT Review Conference engage in a sensible discussion about nuclear
deterrence. States such as Australia, Japan, The Netherlands, Norway, and Tur-
key, which have good disarmament credentials and are protected by U.S. se-
curity guarantees, are well placed to acknowledge the importance they place
on extended deterrence and initiate a serious discussion of how to develop a
security architecture that would render it obsolete.
Discussing nuclear deterrence at an NPT Review Conference or urging
the United States to de-emphasize assurance are easy suggestions to make,
but they would be painful in practice. Daring to mention deterrence in an
NPT forum would draw howls of protest in some quarters. Serious engage-
ment with the United States about doctrine could cause friction. And, most
important, either task would expose domestic fissures that many states want
to leave buried.
Some of these fissures have been exposed in Japan with the debate about
TLAM/N and the advocacy of some Japanese officials for maintaining it. Pre-
sumably in response to domestic concern that Japan was impeding progress
toward disarmament, Japanese Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada took the un-
usual step of writing publicly to his U.S. counterpart, Hillary Clinton, to in-
form her that the “Japanese Government has expressed no view concerning
whether or not your government should possess particular [weapons] systems
such as TLAM/N and RNEP [Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator]. If, hypo-
thetically, such a view was expressed, it would clearly be at variance with my
views, which are in favor of nuclear disarmament.”10
Given that the Strategic Posture Commission report makes clear that the
Japanese officials who briefed it strongly supported retaining TLAM/N, Okada’s
letter implies a deep division between the new Japanese government and the
bureaucracy.
9. See, for example, Frank Miller, “Disarmament and Deterrence: A Practitioner’s View,” in
Abolishing Nuclear Weapons: A Debate, ed. George Perkovich and James M. Acton (Washing-
ton, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2009), 150, http://www.carnegie
endowment.org/files/abolishing_nuclear_weapons_debate.pdf.  
10. Letter from Katsuya Okada to Hillary Clinton, December 24, 2009, unofficial translation,
http://icnndngojapan.files.wordpress.com/2010/01/20091224_okada_letter_en.pdf.
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Japan is hardly the only state internally divided on these issues. NATO
member states are, too. The current NATO Strategic Concept contains the
claim, highlighted by Sagan, that “nuclear weapons make a unique contribu-
tion in rendering the risks of aggression against the Alliance incalculable and
unacceptable.” The adoption of this concept was supported by all NATO
member states. Yet, at the 2005 NPT Review Conference, Norway asserted
that “nuclear weapons must not be seen as an attractive option that will pro-
vide additional security.”11 Similarly, a Canadian working paper from the same
meeting argued that “doctrinal or policy utterances that give the impression
that nuclear weapons are being accorded increased importance in respective
security policies are anathema to disarmament efforts.”12 Because the NATO
Strategic Concept and its doctrinal utterances do not increase the role of nu-
clear weapons, the Canadian statement is not literally inconsistent with them,
but the spirit of it certainly is.
It is tempting for “disarmament advocates” or “deterrence advocates” to
seize, respectively, upon public endorsement of disarmament goals or private
utterances about the importance of nuclear deterrence as representing the
“real” Japan or Norway or Canada. The reality, however, is that both opinions
are equally real, and both have strong roots. It will be difficult to downplay
the importance of assurance with the United States while acknowledging the
role of deterrence for the NPT Review Conference. It will require those who
are charged with defense to acknowledge that they must play a role in achiev-
ing disarmament goals and those tasked with disarmament to recognize the
reality of deterrence. Nevertheless, there is a potentially unifying vision: a dis-
armament process that recognizes the importance of, but also seeks to sup-
plant, nuclear deterrence. 
Beyond reconciling internal divisions, U.S. allies will also have to educate
themselves if they are to take on either of the tasks suggested here. One of the
most telling parts of Foreign Minister Okada’s letter to Secretary Clinton was
his statement that “the Japanese Government is not in a position to judge
whether it is necessary or desirable for your government to possess particular
[weapons] systems.” Many other U.S. allies (even those within NATO with
its Nuclear Planning Group) may feel the same way. This helps to explain why
assurance is difficult; a state that does not understand something is less likely
to trust it. Ultimately, if Foreign Minister Okada is to be convinced by the
“ongoing explanations of your government’s extended deterrence policy” that
he hopes to receive from the United States if TLAM/N is retired, he and his
government will need to understand much more about U.S. extended deter-
11. Statement by Norway to the 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, New York, May 18, 2005, http://www.reachingcriticalwill
.org/legal/npt/RevCon05/GDstatements/norway.doc.
12. Canada, “Nuclear Disarmament,” working paper submitted to the 2005 Review Confer-
ence of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, May 17, 2005,
NPT/CONF.2005/WP.38, http://www.un.org/events/npt2005/working%20papers.html.
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rence strategy. If Japan is to go further and play an active role in shaping U.S.
views on assurance, it will have to move from being a passive recipient of U.S.
explanations to a partner in a two-way dialogue.
Perhaps the first challenge facing U.S. allies is to realize that they can play
a constructive role in disarmament. They need to be more than simply ob-
servers. NATO members, in particular, discuss tactical nuclear-weapon reduc-
tions as if they had no say in the issue. At the 2005 NPT Review Conference,
Belgium, for example, stated its belief that “the reduction of non-strategic
nuclear arsenals, with a view to their final elimination, is an integral part of
the process of global arms reductions and disarmament.”13 Yet Belgium hosts
nuclear weapons on its soil and, as a NATO member, has a say—indeed a
veto—in Strategic Concept discussions. It could clearly do more than just rec-
ognize that disarmament must ultimately involve tactical nuclear weapons.
And, indeed, as this essay goes to press, it appears poised to start playing a
more proactive role.14
This is a lot to expect from U.S. allies. It is convenient politically for
many of them to fail to recognize the role that they could play in disarmament.
The suggestions that they should engage both with the United States to de-
emphasize assurance and with the NPT Review Conference to acknowledge
the reality of deterrence will not be attractive, but both tasks are obligatory
under Article VI. The nuclear disarmament negotiations that Article VI enjoins
all states to commence should not be limited to talks on a treaty to abolish
nuclear weapons at some indefinite time in the future; there are plenty of op-
portunities for U.S. allies to advance disarmament in the forums in which they
participate today.
13. Statement by Belgium to the 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on 
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, unofficial translation, New York, May 4, 2005,
http://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2005/statements/npt04belgium-french.pdf. 
14. “Five NATO States Want U.S. Nukes Out of Europe, Report Says,” Global Security
Newswire, February 19, 2010, http://gsn.nti.org/gsn/nw_20100219_2293.php. 
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Can an elephant and an ant share responsibilities for their jungle habitat? If this
question seems a disrespectful reductio ad absurdum of the well-intentioned
argument in Scott D. Sagan’s essay, “Shared Responsibilities for Nuclear Dis-
armament” (first published in Daedalus, Fall 2009), let me put it another way.
Can there be shared responsibilities in the mitigation of climate change between
the industrialized West, whose profligate environmental pollution in the past
and present is well known as a causal factor of climate change, and little Mal-
dives in the Indian Ocean, whose innocent citizens, pursuing their traditional
livelihood of fishing and new opportunities of tourism, face imminent danger
of drowning in the rising Indian Ocean because of climate change?
The point of departure in Sagan’s article is the revival of interest in nuclear
disarmament in the United States and the world following the publication of
Wall Street Journal op-eds in 2007 and 2008 by George Shultz, William Perry,
Henry Kissinger, and Sam Nunn and the adoption of their vision for a nuclear-
weapons-free world in the 2008 U.S. presidential campaign and, after assum-
ing office, by President Barack Obama. Sadly, the third Wall Street Journal
op-ed written by Shultz and his coauthors in January 2010, which called for
more money to maintain a reliable nuclear deterrent, muddies the waters and
their reputation as disarmament proponents. Sagan’s rebuttals of the critics of
the Obama administration’s policy of seeking a nuclear-weapons-free world
are well argued.
Sagan reminds his readers that the commitments of the United States
under Article VI of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) to pursue
nuclear disarmament are actually reinforced by U.S. law under the U.S. Con-
stitution—hence the gravity of U.S. responsibilities and the firm closure of
the escape hatch of American exceptionalism. The gravamen of Sagan’s argu-
ment is that nuclear-weapons states (NWS) and non-nuclear-weapons states
CHAPTER 3
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(NNWS) must share responsibilities on nuclear issues. Applying this argument
to Articles IV and VI of the NPT does not, however, help to exculpate the NWS
or developed countries, given the text of the Treaty and its negotiating record.
Clearly, all articles of the NPT must be viewed holistically, and compliance with
all of them is a sine qua non for the enjoyment of NPT benefits. There is, for
example, no dispute over NPT parties that the Security Council judges to be
in violation of their Treaty obligations being denied Article IV benefits. The
question that the NNWS raise is why the NWS are not similarly penalized for
failure to honor their Article VI obligations and their Review and Extension
Conference commitments, notwithstanding the 1996 Advisory Opinion of
the International Court of Justice.
Under Article IV, “all parties” have the “inalienable right” to engage in
peaceful uses of nuclear energy and to facilitate and participate in the “fullest
possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological in-
formation.” There is clear reference to parties “in a position to do so” to mak-
ing a contribution either alone or together with other states or international
organizations toward the development of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy,
“especially in the territories” of NNWS in the NPT, “with due consideration
for the needs of the developing areas of the world.”  
The above wording places the NPT squarely in the context of the North-
South relationship and the global transfer of resources and technology. The
development aspect of the NPT has been long forgotten. For decades, devel-
oping countries have complained that the developed countries in the Interna-
tional Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) used their influence to obtain more al-
locations for safeguards than for technical cooperation, even when the assis-
tance was for non-power projects involving agriculture and medicine. The
special assistance program for developing NNWS within the NPT—known as
Footnote A projects—was always underfunded. No incentives were offered to
the NNWS. Moreover, the developing countries among the NNWS cannot be
blamed for the general underfunding of the IAEA. Similar to the budget of
the United Nations, contributions to the regular IAEA budget are already
shared according to an agreed scale of assessment.
The NPT already requires the NNWS to accept IAEA safeguards to verify
their nonproliferation obligations, and some of these states have voluntarily
accepted the Additional Model Protocol—the universalization of which is a
fresh and logical demand. The predicted expansion of nuclear power has led
to fears of the emergence of “virtual nuclear weapon states” and to demands
that the NNWS accept further constraints, beyond the terms of the NPT, on
the exercise of the “inalienable right” to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
In Article VI, although the primary obligation of the NWS for disarma-
ment and nonproliferation that appears in the 1961 Irish-sponsored resolution
in the UN General Assembly was deliberately blurred when the NPT was draft-
ed in the Eighteen-Nation Committee for Disarmament, the current wording
places the disarmament obligation on each of the parties “to pursue negotia-
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tions on nuclear disarmament” in good faith. That the NNWS have done so
by, for example, creating nuclear-weapons-free zones through regional treaty
arrangements, through collective measures in sponsoring and adopting reso-
lutions in the UN General Assembly, and in working in other multilateral fo-
rums is indisputable. 
More important, an objective reading of Article VI must conclude that
the NWS states and their allies have more capabilities, and consequently more
responsibilities, than the NNWS in implementing this Article. In addition, the
International Court of Justice’s Advisory Opinion of 1996 makes it abundant-
ly clear that the NWS have special responsibilities and that arguing for “shared
responsibilities” here has little credibility. Certainly, the NNWS have their share
of responsibilities in all aspects of the NPT—such as signing and ratifying the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and the Additional Protocol of the NPT—
but to interpret shared responsibility as equal responsibility is mistaken. And
yet focusing on what some developed NNWS countries are doing in develop-
ing verification technology is relevant.
A multilateral treaty must reflect a mutuality of interests if it is to serve
the interests of the international community. The NWS carry responsibilities
toward the implementation of the original NPT bargain and past Review Con-
ference declarations. This bargain—legal renunciation of acquiring nuclear
weapons by NNWS subject to verification in return for their agreement to use
nuclear energy solely for peaceful purposes as “an inalienable right” and the
vague and unverified promise of disarmament by NWS—was an unequal one.
These asymmetrical obligations have been aggravated by the failure to fulfill
serious commitments undertaken in successive NPT Review Conferences and
the Review and Extension Conference of 1995 without which the NPT would
never have been extended indefinitely. To argue that NWS responsibilities
under Article VI could be affected by the acquisition of nuclear power by
NNWS is one-sided, especially given that the “nuclear renaissance” is of
recent origin.
The attempt to link Article VI with Article X is correct insofar as the “re-
turn to sender” concept regarding benefits accrued under the NPT—although
the practical implementation of that will not be easy. To propose, however, that
the sovereign right of states to enter and leave treaties freely must be curtailed
beyond the terms stipulated in the NPT to encourage implementation of Ar-
ticle VI is illogical when the reverse can also be argued. The indefinite exten-
sion of the NPT was secured on the basis of the argument that nuclear disarma-
ment could be assured only if the Treaty were made permanent. When the
extension was achieved, no major impact was seen in the reduction of NWS
arsenals.
The NNWS will remain wary of arguments that they should assume more
responsibilities while the NWS remain guilty of failing their obligations. An
inherently discriminatory treaty cannot be strengthened by further discrimi-
nation. That is no way to achieve nuclear nonproliferation and nuclear disar-
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mament—two major objectives of the NPT that are inextricably linked. Just
as the “the polluter pays” principle applies to climate change, the NWS have
the main responsibility for achieving a nuclear-weapons-free world. If there
were no weapons, there would be nothing to proliferate.
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In his article, Scott Sagan outlines a new conceptual framework designed to
encourage nuclear-weapons states (NWS) and non-nuclear-weapons states
(NNWS) to share responsibilities for, inter alia, rethinking extended deter-
rence, with the goal of eventually eliminating nuclear weapons.1 I fully sup-
port the framework that Sagan presents, and I believe that states must do their
utmost to achieve such a noble objective by putting aside their misgivings
about the effectiveness of the nuclear nonproliferation regime at the present
time, even if this may require some states to make sacrifices.  
Turkey is one such state. It has long been a staunch supporter of efforts
to strengthen the nuclear, chemical, and biological nonproliferation regimes,
having become party to virtually all of the formal and informal arrangements
related to them. Turkey has not, however, shared the benefits of being loyal
to the principles and norms of the nonproliferation regimes. 
Turkey signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1969 and
ratified it in 1980. A safeguards agreement with the International Atomic En-
ergy Agency (IAEA) for a 5 MW(th) research reactor constructed in Istanbul
has been in place since 1981. Yet Turkey’s plans for building nuclear power
plants have been obstructed by its Western allies, fearful that Turkey would one
day decide to weaponize its capabilities if it acquired the necessary nuclear tech-
nology and material. These fears stem from rumors regarding Turkey’s close
relations with Pakistan, especially in the early 1980s, when both countries
were under military rule imposed by generals who had seized power in coups
d’état.2 Despite Turkey’s return to democratic rule in the second half of the
1980s, fears lingered that Turkey might seek nuclear technology and materials
that could be diverted to military purposes. In the 1990s, the West focused its
concern on the former Soviet republics inhabited largely by Turkish-speaking
peoples as the potential sources of this technology and nuclear material. 
1. Scott D. Sagan, “Shared Responsibilities for Nuclear Disarmament,” Daedalus 138 (4) (Fall
2009): 157–168.
2. Mustafa Kibaroglu, “Turkey’s Quest for Peaceful Nuclear Power,” The Nonproliferation
Review 4 (3) (Spring-Summer 1997): 33–44.
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Successive Turkish governments, including responsible figures in Turkey’s
military and diplomatic circles, have done nothing to warrant such concern.
On the contrary, Turkey has sought to buttress international confidence in its
peaceful nuclear intentions by demonstrating—especially vis-à-vis its Middle
Eastern neighbors—how a responsible state should behave. In addition to sign-
ing and ratifying the Additional Protocol and the Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty, Turkey joined the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Australia Group,
demonstrating its commitment to the effective control of the export of sensi-
tive and dual-use material and technologies.
Turkey continues to view with great concern the security situation in the
Middle East, which the European members of the North Atlantic Treaty Or-
ganization (NATO) until recently regarded as operationally “out of area.”
Despite the “solidarity clause” in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty of 1949,
which established NATO, Turkey feared that its European NATO allies would
come to Turkey’s aid only if Turkey were attacked by a country or countries
in the Warsaw Pact.3 This perception underscored worries that the solidarity
clause in Article 5 would not extend to an attack from one of Turkey’s Mid-
dle Eastern neighbors, such as Syria or Iraq, both Soviet allies in the 1970s
and 1980s.4
At the same time, Turkey has allowed U.S. nuclear weapons on Turkish
soil since 1960, as part of NATO’s policy of extended deterrence.5 This deci-
sion was initially taken at NATO’s Paris summit in 1957. In addition to Jupiter
missiles that have a range of 3,000 kilometers and a warhead yield of 1.5 mega-
tons, which attracted much public attention due to the role they played in the
resolution of the Cuban crisis in October 1962, beginning in the early 1960s,
nuclear weapons under U.S. Air Force custody that could be delivered by F-100,
F-104, and F-4 aircraft were also deployed from air bases in Eskisehir, Malatya
(Erhac), Ankara (Murted), and Balikesir.6 On April 14, 1963, the U.S. Polaris
submarine USS Sam Houston visited the Turkish port of Izmir in a display of
NATO solidarity with Turkey and to demonstrate the alliance’s commitment
to extended nuclear deterrence.7
Believing that Turkey was safe from attack by countries in the Warsaw Pact,
Turkish policy-makers focused their attention on the proliferation of weapons
of mass destruction (WMD) in the Middle East. Acquisition of chemical, bio-
logical, and especially nuclear weapons by Turkey’s immediate neighbors poses
3. Interview with General Çevik Bir (ret.), former Deputy Chief of Turkish General Staff,
January 19, 2005, Istanbul.
4. Mustafa Kibaroglu, “Turkey,” in Europe and Nuclear Disarmament: Debates and Political
Attitudes in 16 European Countries, ed. Harald Müller (Brussels: European Interuniversity
Press, 1998), 161–193.
5. Mustafa Kibaroglu, “La Turquie, les États-Unis, et l’OTAN: Une alliance dans l’Alliance,”
Questions Internationales (12) (March-April 2005): 30–32.
6. Conversations with a retired top military commander who wished to remain anonymous,
February 15, 2010, Ankara. 
7. Ed Offley, Scorpion Down, Sunk by the Soviet, Buried by the Pentagon: The Untold Story of
USS Scorpion (New York: Basic Books, 2007), 195.
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a significant threat to the country’s security and stability. For this reason, dur-
ing the Cold War, the Turkish government opposed Soviet proposals to create
a Balkans nuclear-weapons-free zone (NWFZ), which would have included
Turkey. However, the Turkish government supported the creation of a nuclear-
weapons-free zone in the Middle East (NWFZ/ME), provided that any agree-
ment establishing this zone did not, by definition, include Turkey as part of
the Middle East. 
Turkish leaders, including President Abdullah Gul, Prime Minister Recep
Tayyip Erdogan, and Chiefs of the General Staff Generals Hilmi Ozkok, Yasar
Buyukanit, and Ilker Basbug, have repeatedly stated that a lasting solution to
WMD proliferation in the Middle East will require the creation of a NWFZ,
which should eventually be expanded into a regional WMD-free zone.8
Recently Turkey has been seen as part of the Middle East because of its
involvement in a number of regional political issues. Not only has Turkey acted
as a mediator between Syria and Israel, but it has proposed to take on a simi-
lar function concerning the nuclear issue vis-à-vis Iran, Israel, and the United
States. To be consistent with its policy of supporting a NWFZ/ME, Turkey
will be expected to denuclearize its territory first. The Turkish government
should therefore seek the withdrawal of U.S. nuclear weapons from Turkey
before other states in the region request that it do so. This decision should not
be tied to, for instance, cuts in the tactical nuclear weapons in the Russian
arsenal, as suggested in the Briefing Note published by the Center for Euro-
pean Reform.9
In general, Turkish officials attach greater political value to nuclear weap-
ons than they do military value. They do not seriously contemplate contingen-
cies where nuclear weapons could or even should be used. Yet some believe
that U.S. nuclear weapons deployed in Turkey have a deterrent purpose.10
Uncertainty surrounding the political situation in Iraq, the Palestine-Israel
conflict, and Iran’s nuclear program, which is suspected of having weapons-
development capabilities, make peace and stability in the Middle East and the
adjacent regions appear elusive. Uncertainties regarding the full scope of Iran’s
nuclear capabilities and intentions further complicate Turkish threat assessments.
Against this background, some Turkish officials believe that allowing U.S. nu-
clear weapons to remain in Turkey is sensible. Another reason centers on the
nature and scope of U.S.-Turkish relations, which have suffered serious set-
backs since the 2003 Iraq war. Some Turkish officials fear that withdrawal of
8. Mustafa Kibaroglu, “EURATOM & ABACC: Safeguard Models for the Middle East?” in
A Zone Free of Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East, ed. Jan Prawitz and James F.
Leonard (New York and Geneva: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 1996),
93–123.
9. Franklin Miller, George Robertson, and Kori Schake, “Germany Opens Pandora’s Box,”
Briefing Note (London: Center for European Reform, February 2010), 1–3.
10. Many Turkish government officials and military officers expressed these and similar views
in not-for-attribution interviews and private conversations over a long period of time during
the author’s deliberations on these matters.
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nuclear weapons could weaken Turkey’s long-standing strategic alliance with
the United States. Others view their presence as part of the “burden sharing”
principle of NATO. Still others believe that Turkey and its other allies should
host a symbolic number of U.S. nuclear weapons on their territory, so that
Turkey is not the only NATO country other than the United States to permit
U.S. nuclear weapons on its soil.11
Despite powerful arguments to the contrary, the removal of U.S. nuclear
weapons from Turkey would strengthen the Turkish government’s position
vis-à-vis aspiring nuclear states in the region, improve the prospects of a
NWFZ/ME, and be compatible with Turkey’s long-standing efforts to stem
proliferation. Such action from Turkey—a significant regional military power
and a member of NATO—would signal to Iran, Israel, and the Arab states
that nuclear weapons are no longer vital for maintaining security.12 Moreover,
according to General Ergin Celasin (ret.), a former commander of the Turk-
ish Air Force (TUAF), nuclear weapons that reportedly remain in Turkey
cannot be linked to the Turkish military. TUAF’s role in NATO’s nuclear con-
tingency plans has come to an end with the withdrawal of nuclear weapons in
the 1990s from the Air Force units that were deployed in several air bases in
Turkey.13 General Celasin’s words suggest that the Turkish Air Force no longer
has a nuclear mission under NATO, which it had under the Cold War dual-key
arrangements. This underscores that the U.S. nuclear deterrent on submarines
or in the United States could just as easily continue to serve the limited extend-
ed deterrent function of protecting Turkey from the unlikely event of a Russian
nuclear strike. Hence, the deployment of U.S. nuclear weapons in Turkey and
NATO’s “first use” policy are no longer necessary.14
As a final note, if we ask Turkey to be ready to make sacrifices in order to
share responsibilities even without sharing the benefits, the “holdouts”—India,
Israel, North Korea, and Pakistan—must also be ready to act along the lines of
both NWS and NNWS who are seeking to strike a balance between their rights
and responsibilities. Without the involvement of these holdouts, nuclear disar-
mament cannot succeed.
11. Mustafa Kibaroglu, “Isn’t it Time to Say Farewell to US Nukes in Turkey?”European 
Security 14 (4) (December 2005): 443–457.
12. Mustafa Kibaroglu, “A Turkish Nuclear Turnaround,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 63 (6)
(November-December 2007): 64.
13. Telephone interview with General Ergin Celasin (ret.), former Commander of the Turkish
Air Force, February 15, 2010, Ankara.
14. For an explanation of how no-first-use would produce a more tailored and more credible
form of extended deterrence, see Scott D. Sagan, “The Case for No First Use,” Survival 51 (3)
(June-July 2009): 163–182.
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In his article, Scott Sagan offers a robust approach to nuclear disarmament
that bridges the gap between nuclear-weapons states (NWS) and non-nuclear-
weapons states (NNWS). His discussion of the shared responsibility of NWS
and NNWS for implementing Articles IV and VI of the Nuclear Non-Prolifer-
ation Treaty (NPT) and for dealing with enforcement and withdrawal issues
as common endeavors rather than as separate responsibilities divided between
these two groups of states is especially useful. Below I focus on three key issues
in which I basically agree with Sagan, but with a few reservations.
The first issue concerns multinational fuel-cycle facilities. Sagan rightly
notes that the expected expansion of nuclear power makes the future pursuit of
sensitive national fuel-cycle facilities incompatible with the notion of a nuclear-
weapons-free world. Internationally shared and managed fuel-cycle facilities
offer the best solution to this problem. Sagan proposes that NWS start by
voluntarily submitting some sensitive fuel-cycle facilities to international safe-
guards and then consider the possibility of eventually making all of their plants
subject to these safeguards. In addressing this issue in 2005, however, the
International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) international expert group on
multinational fuel arrangements reached the following conclusion:1
A new binding international norm stipulating that sensitive fuel-cycle ac-
tivities are to be conducted exclusively in the context of MNAs [multi-
national agreements] and no longer as a national undertaking would
amount to a change in the scope of Article IV of the NPT. The wording
and negotiation history of this article emphasize the right of each party in
good standing to choose its national fuel cycle on the basis of sovereign
considerations. This right is not independent of the State parties’ respon-
sibilities under Articles I and II. But if the necessary conditions are met,
no legal barrier stands in the way of each State party to pursue all fuel-
1. I was the German representative in this group. Since I was heavily involved in negotiating
this particular language, I feel entitled to quote it here at some length.
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cycle activities on a national basis. Waiving this right would thus change
the “bargain” of the NPT. 
Such a fundamental change may be possible if the parties were able
to agree on a broader negotiating framework. For NNWS, such a bargain
could probably be realized only through the adoption of universal princi-
ples, applicable to all states, and with additional steps by NWS regarding
nuclear disarmament. In addition, a verifiable FMCT [Fissile Material Cut-
off Treaty] might be one of the preconditions for binding multilateral ob-
ligations. Because such a treaty would terminate the right of participating
NWS and non-NPT parties to operate reprocessing and enrichment facili-
ties for nuclear weapons purposes, it would level the playing field between
NWS and NNWS. The new restrictions would apply to all states and fa-
cilities with the relevant technologies, without exception. At that time,
multilateral arrangements could become a universal, binding principle.2
Persuading reluctant NNWS such as Argentina, Brazil, or South Africa to
consider MNAs would require a monumental shift in how states think about
national nuclear activities. The requirements go far beyond the various pro-
posals submitted by NWS in the last few years, which can be summarized as
offering guaranteed services for the civilian fuel cycles, such as enrichment,
fuel fabrication, interim storage of spent fuel or spent fuel reprocessing and
conditioning, while maintaining their national nuclear autonomy.3 This is un-
tenable. Sagan’s discussion of the role of an FMCT is significant in this regard,
although I would disagree with his recommendation to establish a new NWS
organization of inspectors to verify facilities and fissile material in NWS rather
than relying on the IAEA to perform these functions. The time for dividing
the NWS and NNWS has passed. Where access by NNWS inspectors to sensi-
tive former weapons-material production facilities is problematic, a special
office within the IAEA’s safeguards department, consisting exclusively of NWS-
origin inspectors, could be created.
The second issue concerns the future of extended deterrence. The cur-
rent extended deterrence situation in Europe underscores the tremendous
change in the attitudes of many NNWS NATO allies toward nuclear disarma-
ment. Nowhere is this more obvious than in my country, Germany. In the
coalition agreement that now governs the Federal Republic, the position of
the Conservatives and the Liberals reads as follows:
We emphatically support President [Barack] Obama’s proposals for 
far-reaching new disarmament initiatives—including the objective of 
a nuclear-weapons-free world. . . . We want to use the NPT Review
2. Multilateral Approaches to the Nuclear Fuel Cycle Expert Group Report to the Director General
of the International Atomic Energy Agency (Vienna: IAEA, 2005). 
3. Cf. Harald Müller, Multilateralisierung des Brennstoffkreislaufs: Ein Ausweg aus den Nuklear-
krisen? (Frankfurt am Main: PRIF, HSFK Report, October 2006); Yuri Yudin, Multilateraliza-
tion of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle: Assessing the Existing Proposals (New York and Geneva: UNIDIR,
2009).
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Conference in 2010 to create new momentum for treaty-based regula-
tions. In this context, and in the context of a new strategic concept for
NATO, we will strongly promote within the Alliance and vis-à-vis the
American allies the withdrawal of the nuclear weapons still in Germany.4
Liberal and Conservative speakers confirmed this objective in a recent de-
bate in the German Parliament.5 In addition, Germany is consulting with other
NATO NNWS on ways to promote this goal. Given that Germany has histori-
cally been the main beneficiary of extended deterrence, the coalition’s new
position indicates that the perceived need for a first-use nuclear guarantee in
Europe has largely disappeared.
Nevertheless, there are allies (for example, Poland, the Baltic States, and
Turkey) for which the nuclear guarantee maintains a higher degree of salience
than it does for the Western and Northern Europeans. This brings me to the
third key issue: the crucial role of the NWS in shaping the security environment
for NNWS. The security concerns of states in Eastern Europe derive largely
from Russia’s unfriendly policies toward its neighbors; for Turkey, this concern
has been revived by Russia’s harsh actions in Georgia. The establishment of a
good neighbor policy by Russia would lay these security concerns to rest. The
same is true for East Asia: a more pacifist China, with lower armament rates,
less naval posturing, and the withdrawal of missiles from the coast facing Tai-
wan, would reduce concern among the Japanese and South Korean defense
communities of the likelihood of a Chinese first use of nuclear weapons. 
The behavior and doctrines of NWS influence the security of NNWS in
yet another way, as the Turkish case again demonstrates. Turkey’s interest in
continued extended deterrence is, of course, also related to the potential Iran-
ian threat. This threat has continued to grow largely because of the constraints
placed on the UN Security Council by China’s and Russia’s extremely short-
sighted and parochial policies. Consequently, NWS must abstain from issuing
threats against NNWS in good standing with the NPT, while acting with de-
termination against rule breakers. This combination of changed attitudes and
threatened action would largely eliminate the need for an extended deterrence
commitment that goes beyond deterrence of a nuclear attack.6
My final thought concerns Sagan’s discussion about security assurances
and the use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The debate about nega-
tive and positive security guarantees has suffered because NWS and NNWS
have never jointly deliberated about the consequences that states should face
if they are the first to use nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons. The secu-
rity assurance debate has been largely ritualistic and lacking in substance.
4. WACHSTUM. BILDUNG. ZUSAMMENHALT. Koalitionsvertrag zwischen CDU, CSU
und FDP 17. Legislaturperiode, Berlin, October 26, 2010.
5. Deutscher Bundestag, Stenografischer Bericht, 9. Sitzung, Berlin, December 3, 2009, 646–653.
6. See Scott D. Sagan, “The Case for No First Use,” Survival 51 (3) (June 2009).
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I would therefore propose the establishment of a standing conference of se-
curity diplomats and military experts from NWS and NNWS to discuss how
the international community should respond to WMD first use.7 As an ex-
plicit component of the effort to abolish nuclear weapons, the conference
could be installed by the UN General Assembly as a deliberative forum that
would eventually become a negotiation body. An international legal instru-
ment, adopted by the General Assembly with the prescribed two-thirds ma-
jority and endorsed by the Security Council, would be an outstanding step
on the road to nuclear disarmament. Such a legal instrument would clear the
field for the universal adoption of a no-first-use doctrine and enhance the se-
curity of all states that feel threatened by the biological and chemical capabili-
ties of others.
7. For earlier ideas on this point, cf. Harald Müller, “Between Security Council Inaction and
Self-Helplessness: The Case for a Positive Security Assurances Alliance,” in Security Assurances,
Implications for the NPT and Beyond, ed. Virginia Foran (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endow-
ment for International Peace, 1995), S. 25–38.
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1. Remarks by President Barack Obama at Suntory Hall, Tokyo, on November 14, 2009;
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-barack-obama-suntory-hall.
The concept of deterrence, let alone that of extended deterrence, needs to be
redefined in a new light. Reducing the role of nuclear weapons in deterrence
strategy should be pursued for the sake of nuclear disarmament.
However, from the perspective of an American ally in Northeast Asia, the
proposed “rethinking of extended deterrence” must be addressed in a much
broader security context than the “conceptual framework” Scott Sagan proposes
in his stimulating article, “Shared Responsibilities for Nuclear Disarmament.”
At the very least, consideration must be given to (1) the regional security con-
ditions surrounding alliances, (2) the present level of strategic consultations
within alliances, and (3) the long-term prospects of the changing strategic bal-
ance between the United States and its allies, on one side, and its strategic rivals,
on the other.
This underlines the importance of a regional rather than a global approach
to rethinking extended deterrence, for, on all these subjects, the tasks and pri-
orities for U.S. alliances in Northeast Asia are different, for example, from
those for NATO. In contrast to Europe, where the end of the Cold War has
remarkably reduced the threat of nuclear weapons, Asia has been witnessing
nuclear weapons proliferation during the past two decades.
For Japan and South Korea, deterring North Korean aggression while
pursuing the goal of a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula is the top security re-
quirement at present. U.S. extended deterrence is essential to that end. The
U.S. government has long been firm in assuring its Asian allies of its commit-
ment to deterrence, and President Barack Obama’s assurances have been un-
equivocal. In a speech during his first official visit to Tokyo in November 2009,
President Obama stated: “So long as these [nuclear] weapons exist, the United
States will maintain a strong and effective nuclear deterrent that guarantees the
defense of our allies—including South Korea and Japan.”1
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What is equally important for the credibility of the U.S. commitment is
not now to change the U.S. declaratory deterrence strategy. No-first-use ar-
guments are plausible in the context of nuclear disarmament. In the eyes of
those depending on U.S. extended deterrence for their security, however,
Washington’s policy of not excluding the possibility of first use of nuclear
weapons is essential for the credibility of U.S. extended deterrence. Politically,
too, a unilateral change in the U.S. declaratory strategy in the face of North
Korea’s tenacious pursuit of nuclear weapons and missile development would
only encourage Pyongyang. Moreover, it would be unwise at this time to
limit the purpose of retaining nuclear weapons solely to deter nuclear threats.
It is indeed questionable whether nuclear weapons are suitable to deter
the threats posed by biological or chemical weapons. Nevertheless, it is also
true that no assured means are available for deterring the use of non-nuclear
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) such as biological and chemical weapons.
In this strategic dilemma, it is inadvisable to exclude the possibility, debatable
as it might be, that countries such as North Korea suspected of possessing
these WMD would refrain from their use for fear of being punished with nu-
clear retaliation.
Contrary to the assertion made by Sagan in his article, I have never “rec-
ommended that the United States should now threaten to retaliate with nu-
clear weapons if North Korea uses chemical or biological weapons in any future
conflict.” At the 2009 conference organized by the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, I stressed the need for ambiguity in coping with the threats
of biological and chemical weapons, underscoring the distinction between the
option of openly rejecting the use of nuclear weapons in response to a biolog-
ical or chemical weapons attack and that of not saying anything about the
point, keeping those to be deterred in suspense. At that conference, I simply
noted that “without credible means for deterring the use of biological and
chemical weapons, it would be too early to limit the purpose of nuclear deter-
rence solely to deterring the use of nuclear weapons. This is particularly true
for Northeast Asia, where North Korea is suspected to possess both biological
and chemical weapons.”2
It must also be pointed out that the Japanese government’s pronounced
policy of relying on the U.S. nuclear deterrent to protect the country “against
the threat of nuclear weapons” was originally formed as part of the first Defense
Program Outlines adopted in 1976, when the so-called sole purpose of nuclear
weapons was not the question at issue. As I noted in my Carnegie conference
presentation, Tokyo and Washington announced in 2007 that “both nuclear
and non-nuclear strike forces and defense capabilities” of the United States
formed the core of extended deterrence, without specifying the object of this
2. Panel transcript “Are the Requirements for Extended Deterrence Changing?” Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace, April 6, 2009, http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/
npc_extended_deterrence1.pdf.
ON RETHINKING EXTENDED DETERRENCE 33
deterrence. I believe that the planned revision of the official Defense Program
Outlines should reflect this line of thought.
On the other hand, Sagan arguably proposes that “those U.S. allies that
remain concerned about conventional or chemical and biological threats to
their security should . . . help to develop the conventional forces and defen-
sive systems that could wean themselves away from excessive reliance on U.S.
nuclear weapons for extended deterrence.”
Although Sagan’s depiction of the allies’ reliance on U.S. nuclear weapons
as “excessive” is his own, Japan-U.S. defense cooperation has already been
progressing in the direction he suggests. Strengthened cooperation in the de-
ployment and development of missile defense systems against North Korean
missiles is a case in point. Japan-U.S. defense cooperation will no doubt be-
come increasingly important, particularly as the role that advanced conven-
tional weapons systems play in the deterrence strategy is expanded. Japanese
efforts to rectify long-recognized deficiencies in sharing responsibilities under
the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty are required more than ever.
This leads to the second subject that must be taken into consideration in
rethinking extended deterrence: the level of strategic consultations within al-
liances. Unlike NATO, the Japan-U.S. security arrangements lack a mechanism
for consultations on nuclear strategy, as does the South Korea-U.S. alliance,
so far as I understand. The Japanese case is more conspicuous, for the govern-
ment has long been reluctant to be involved in U.S. nuclear strategy. The pub-
lic’s strong anti-nuclear-weapons sentiment is behind this.
It has therefore been an epoch-making development that the Japanese
and U.S. governments have, since 2009, begun to explore ways to commence
consultations on extended deterrence. As of this writing, though, the alliance
has not overcome the unprecedented jolt caused by the widely reported clum-
siness of the new coalition government led by Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama
of the Democratic Party of Japan in trying to undo (without proposing any
feasible alternative) the long-agreed plan to relocate the U.S. Marine Corps
air station from Futenma, Okinawa—a goal central to the 1996 agreement to
reduce burdens on local communities caused by the U.S. force presence on
the island. It is crucial that the two governments, particularly the Japanese,
make every effort to put alliance cooperation back on the right track and pur-
sue their alleged purpose of “deepening” alliance relations through the year
2010, which marks the fiftieth anniversary of the current Security Treaty.
Closer consultations on how to facilitate the functioning of U.S. extended
deterrence should be an important part of deeper alliance cooperation.
In the absence of a bilateral agreement on secrecy protection as required by
U.S. law, Tokyo-Washington consultations on nuclear strategy will not reach
the level of NATO’s Nuclear Planning Group. Nevertheless, there are many is-
sues that the two governments can and must discuss below that level, particularly
prospective changes in the roles of nuclear and non-nuclear weapons in the U.S.
deterrence strategy and, subsequently, required Japan-U.S. defense cooperation
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for common deterrence purposes. The declaratory part of the U.S. deterrence
strategy should also be an important agenda item for such consultations.
Another important step is to link Japan-U.S. consultations on extended
deterrence with those between South Korea and the United States. Organizing
a trilateral mechanism for strategic consultations would not be diplomatically
advisable, for it might make China and Russia unnecessarily suspicious and
further harden North Korea’s stance. Given the common interest of Japan
and South Korea in enhancing the credibility of U.S. extended deterrence,
though, the time has come for the two countries to begin to coordinate their
efforts to that end, at least through a set of three bilateral consultations:
Japan-U.S., South Korea-U.S., and Japan-South Korea.
Finally, the implications of reductions in U.S. and Russian nuclear stock-
piles for U.S. extended deterrence will have to be assessed carefully, as progress
in this area would eventually affect the nuclear force balance among the United
States, Russia, and China. Russia and China are no longer adversaries of the
United States and its allies. Still, the two countries remain causes for concern,
particularly for U.S. allies in Asia, because of the dictatorial nature of their
regimes and the aggressiveness increasingly seen in their external postures.
The continued growth of China’s military power and its lack of transparency
are yet other causes for concern in the Asia-Pacific region. Moreover, a bilat-
eral nuclear force balance that Washington would regard as acceptable in rela-
tions with Moscow and Beijing might not be reassuring enough to U.S. allies
in Asia in the context of the credibility of U.S. extended deterrence.
This issue would perhaps not draw attention before U.S. and Russian nu-
clear stockpiles each approach the one thousand level. Yet it must be seen as
an important subject for consideration in rethinking extended deterrence be-
tween Tokyo and Washington as well as between Seoul and Washington, and,
one hopes, among all three.
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Scott Sagan’s article on “Shared Responsibilities for Nuclear Disarmament”
does more than provide a strong analysis of disarmament and Article VI of the
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). It also establishes a set of links between this
issue and other provisions of the NPT, such as peaceful uses of nuclear energy
(Article IV) and the withdrawal clause (Article X).
On the issue of disarmament and deterrence, Sagan’s article reminds me
of a discussion I once had with a former professor, Louis Halle of the United
States. Halle was a great believer in the merits of nuclear deterrence. When I
mentioned the merits of nuclear disarmament, he asked, “Why nuclear disar-
mament? Do you want us to go back to the bow and arrow?” Halle believed
that without nuclear weapons, conventional wars would erupt more frequently.
Sagan notes that this belief, a kind of faith in nuclear deterrence, continues
to exist in many circles in the United States. In his article, he cites multiple
examples of such thinking and notes that concerns about conventional weap-
ons imbalances will need to be seriously addressed at some point in the nuclear
disarmament process. 
The eradication of nuclear weapons would be similar to the eradication
of smallpox. In the case of smallpox, miniscule amounts of the deadly virus
are kept for research purposes at the Centers for Disease Control in the United
States and at the State Research Center of Virology and Biotechnology VEC-
TOR in Russia. Similarly, it might be prudent to maintain a small amount of
nuclear weapons materials, under strict safeguards, for some unexpected, future
purpose. In Rome in April 2009, former Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev
identified one such contingency: the possible need for nuclear weapons in the
event of a potential collision between Earth and a meteor that could destroy
the planet. Some scientists expect this scenario to occur in the third decade of
this century. Aside from such contingencies, there should be no reason for
maintaining nuclear weapons. In view of the fact that the NPT does not allow
the transfer of nuclear weapons or other nuclear-exclusive devices to any re-
cipient whatsoever, this would prohibit putting this force under international
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or UN control. The NPT could be amended to allow such a transfer in ex-
traordinary circumstances and especially in a world almost completely free of
nuclear weapons, except for what is needed to face the threat to the planet
from outer space. 
Moreover, I agree with Sagan that “the current nuclear disarmament effort
must be transformed from a debate among leaders in the NWS [nuclear-weapons
states] to a coordinated global effort of shared responsibilities between NWS
and NNWS [non-nuclear-weapons states].” Under the NPT today, however,
the NWS appear to be more equal than others—that is, the NNWS. Despite
Sagan’s observation that Articles IV and VI of the NPT are written to apply
to the NWS and the NNWS, the lack of equality is obvious. Here I would note
that the NWS definitely bear more responsibilities and obligations than the
NNWS, whether with regard to the elimination of nuclear weapons and dis-
armament, in general, or with regard to the transfer of nuclear technology for
peaceful purposes.
In the case of the transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes,
multinational approaches are needed, whereby sharing in the decision-making
process should be among the conditions for cooperation. At the same time,
not all states should necessarily have access to sensitive technologies. As I dis-
cussed in my article published in the Winter 2010 issue of Daedalus, participa-
tion in this process is more important than all schemes of assurances of supply
that do not make room for a decision-sharing mechanism between the supplier
and the user.
With regard to Article IV of the NPT and its relationship to the commit-
ment, under Article II, not to seek or to receive any assistance in the manu-
facture of nuclear weapons, I would like to quote from a 1968 statement by
William Foster, leader of the U.S. delegation to the UN’s Eighteen-Nation
Committee on Disarmament in Geneva in his testimony before the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee. On the meaning of the term “manufacture,”
as prohibited by the NPT, Foster stated: 
It may be useful to point out for illustrative purposes, several activities
which the United States would not consider per se to be violations of the
prohibitions in Article II. Neither uranium enrichment nor the stockpiling
of fissionable material in connection with a peaceful program would violate
Article II so long as these activities were safeguarded under Article III.
Thus, Article IV of the NPT does not prohibit NNWS from uranium
enrichment activities, provided they are adequately safeguarded and judged
to be in conformity with Article II of the NPT. Both the IAEA and the UN
Security Council, either individually or collectively, depending on the type of
violation, bear the responsibility for judging whether a state is in compliance
with Article II. In the case of transferring nuclear weapons from one state to
another, for instance, the UN Security Council would be responsible for judg-
ing the state’s compliance with Article II.
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With regard to nuclear disarmament, the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) should have responsibility for verifying states’ compliance
with a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT). I therefore disagree with
Sagan’s proposal of creating a new organization for this purpose. Indeed, the
IAEA would be bolstered by the addition of this new task. Over the years,
the IAEA has continued to accumulate experience in inspecting enrichment
facilities and reprocessing plants, making it the ideal candidate for verifying
FMCT compliance.
The NNWS are already involved in a variety of shared activities in the dis-
armament process, and their role could be expanded to include the following
responsibilities: 
• Exerting pressure on the NWS to make progress within the framework
of the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, where the NNWS are 
well represented, as well as in the UN General Assembly and its First 
Committee;
• Putting forward ideas and proposals on specific issues, without waiting 
for the NWS to take the initiative;
• Sharing financially in the application of IAEA safeguards, as mentioned 
by Sagan, but not at the expense of technical assistance that NNWS 
badly need, assistance that remains far below the required level because 
safeguards expenses have been higher than the funds available for tech-
nical assistance; and
• Playing a role in bilateral negotiations between the United States and 
Russia, such as the ongoing negotiations of the so-called START II 
follow-on agreement (note that the Partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963 
was negotiated between the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and 
the United States; much later, in 1996, the Comprehensive Test Ban 
Treaty was agreed upon after a long period of multilateral negotiations).
The role of NNWS in future arms control negotiations should be en-
hanced. NNWS participation in disarmament, and in particular nuclear disar-
mament, should be expanded whenever feasible.
I applaud Sagan’s mention of the 13 Practical Steps agreed upon at the
2000 NPT Review Conference. Not only are they useful examples of shared
responsibilities, but they generate hope that more can be done in the future.
Finally, I would like to comment briefly on Sagan’s discussion of the with-
drawal clause of the NPT. A state that withdraws from the NPT for reasons
acceptable to the UN Security Council should not be penalized by any “re-
turn to sender” clause. The withdrawal clause represents a safety valve that
should be protected and remain unaltered. States that withdraw after violating
the NPT, however, should be penalized, either by the Security Council if their
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violations constitute a threat to world peace and security or by the parties to
the NPT themselves, collectively or individually, and in accordance with the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.  
In conclusion, the NPT Review Conference, such as the one to be held in
May 2010, represents an opportunity for the NWS and the NNWS to expand
their shared responsibilities for nuclear disarmament and beyond.
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We may not have a nuclear power renaissance yet—significant regulatory and
economic hurdles remain—but the past two years have indeed brought about
a renaissance in the nuclear disarmament debate, at least in the debate con-
ducted in the English language. After a dark age in which leading policy-makers
and theorists in nuclear-weapons states (NWS) either denied the reality of their
nuclear disarmament obligations or regretted them—as Scott Sagan recalls in
his paper on “Shared Responsibilities for Nuclear Disarmament”—a rebirth
started, perhaps, around 2007.
The first prophecies appeared in The Wall Street Journal in an op-ed written
by the “Four Statesmen” under the title “A World Free of Nuclear Weapons.”2
They were followed by British Foreign Secretary Margaret Beckett’s keynote
speech at the Carnegie International Nonproliferation Conference, which add-
ed a somewhat cautious, if practical-minded interrogation point to the now
famous piece.3 Then came the studies funded by the United Kingdom and
Norway on the verification of nuclear warhead dismantlement. From this came
George Perkovich and James Acton’s Adelphi Paper 396,4 which was vigor-
ously debated, by Sagan and me, among others, in a volume published by the
Carnegie Endowment.5
We had, of course, the groundbreaking Prague speech on April 5, 2009,
by U.S. President Barack Obama, which was very well received around the
world, including in non-nuclear-weapons states (NNWS) such as Brazil. We
CHAPTER 8
Shared Responsibilities,
Shared Rights 
Achilles Zaluar1
1. The views expressed in this comment are exclusively the author’s personal views and do not
necessarily reflect the positions of the Brazilian government.
2. George P. Shultz, William J. Perry, Henry A. Kissinger, and Sam Nunn, “A World Free of
Nuclear Weapons,” The Wall Street Journal, January 4, 2007.
3. Margaret Beckett, “Keynote Address: A World Free of Nuclear Weapons?” Carnegie Endow-
ment for International Peace International Nonproliferation Conference, June 25, 2007.
4. George Perkovich and James M. Acton, “Abolishing Nuclear Weapons,” Adelphi Paper 396
(London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2008).
5. Abolishing Nuclear Weapons: A Debate, ed. George Perkovich and James M. Acton (Wash-
ington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2009). 
40 SHARED RESPONSIBILITIES FOR NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT: A GLOBAL DEBATE
saw the report by the International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation
and Disarmament, co-chaired by Gareth Evans and Yoriko Kawaguchi,6 a use-
ful and quite detailed update to the more pithy report from 1996 of the Can-
berra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, which had been
sponsored by the same Gareth Evans when he was Australia’s Foreign Minister.
Attentive readers paid attention to Thinking about Nuclear Weapons: Princi-
ples, Problems, Prospects,7 particularly Chapter 12—“The abolition of nuclear
armouries?”—in which Michael Quinlan, the brain behind NATO’s nuclear
deterrence doctrine, engages in serious and constructive discussion of the
eliminationist perspective. Last but not least are the two special issues of the
American Academy of Arts and Sciences’ journal Daedalus “On the Global
Nuclear Future,” edited by Steven E. Miller and Scott D. Sagan. (Sagan’s
paper on “Shared Responsibilities for Nuclear Disarmament” is published in
volume 1.)8
What are the causes of this renaissance? There can be little doubt that it
is motivated by serious concern, among scholars and politicians alike, that the
global nuclear nonproliferation regime might be in jeopardy. The regime had
had, shall we say, a bad decade: the 1998 nuclear tests by India and Pakistan;
the 1999 rejection of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) by the U.S.
Senate (a decision that impacted nonproliferation in the way the fall of Lehman
Brothers in 2008 impacted the world financial system); the 1999 NATO Nu-
clear Doctrine, the 2001 U.S. Nuclear Posture Review, and nuclear policy
statements by other NWS, which gave nuclear weapons renewed salience and
seemed to debase the validity of Article VI of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty (NPT); the revelations about the A.Q. Khan network and the Iranian,
North Korean, and Libyan nuclear programs; the attempts to discredit the In-
ternational Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the political manipulation of
intelligence about nuclear issues in the run-up to the 2003 invasion of Iraq;
the neglect and obstructionism that drove the 2005 NPT Review Conference
off course, despite the best efforts of its president and of the New Agenda
Coalition of major NNWS; the North Korean nuclear tests; the Israeli-Syrian
incident of 2007; the controversy about the relationship of the regime with
non-NPT nuclear-armed states; and the forced paralysis of the Geneva Confer-
ence on Disarmament. 
On top of it all, while two of the three pillars of the nonproliferation
regime—non-acquisition (Article II) and disarmament (Article VI)—were, as
we recalled, under stress, sectors in the think-tank and academic world could
think of nothing better than to attack the third pillar, peaceful uses (Article IV).
6. “Eliminating Nuclear Threats: A Practical Agenda for Global Policymakers,” Report of the
International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, December 15, 2009.
7. Michael Quinlan, Thinking About Nuclear Weapons: Principles, Problems, Prospects (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2009).
8. “On the Global Nuclear Future,” volumes 1 and 2, ed. Steven E. Miller and Scott D. Sagan,
Daedalus 138 (4) (Fall 2009) and 139 (1) (Winter 2010).
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Fueled by ingenuity and grants, a cottage industry of reports, articles, op-eds,
and think-tank pieces appeared, in which danger to the regime was identified
not in clandestine bomb-making programs, nor in failure to disarm, but in
the exercise of the “inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop
research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without
discrimination,” even if such actions are in conformity with the non-transfer
and non-acquisition provisions of Articles I and II, and even if they are per-
formed under IAEA safeguards.
Like new Mark Antonys, the proponents had come not to praise, but to
bury the NPT, which they claimed was full of “loopholes.” Like the Roman
demagogue, they may not have fully thought through the consequences of
their ideas. If we would in haste bury the NPT, is it at all likely that, in today’s
world, we could come up with something safer and better? 
The danger that this approach, if tried by influential states, could bring
to an already debilitated regime was quickly identified. It seemed to be on the
cusp of forcing many NNWS to exercise their inalienable right earlier and more
vigorously than they may have envisaged, because of the prospect of losing
that right. Nations that had abandoned or mothballed their nuclear fuel-cycle
programs started rushing to reactivate them. Even states that had been calmly
and patiently building up their national capacities, in full compliance with non-
proliferation commitments, were tempted to become more vigilant and guard-
ed in their international intercourse. 
By themselves, each of these developments may not be particularly worri-
some, but overall they point to a gradual loss of trust in the viability of a rules-
based international order and to a correspondingly greater recourse to self-
help. Fortunately, President Obama put these concerns to rest when he point-
ed out in his speech in Prague that “the basic bargain is sound” and that “no
approach will succeed if it is based on the denial of rights to nations that play
by the rules.” 
Scott Sagan’s piece belongs, of course, to a much sounder lineage than
Loophole Theory. Sagan, like me, is a true believer in the NPT. He proposes to
shore up the nonproliferation regime as it exists by seeking creative, realistic
ways of implementing its provisions, and drawing new avenues of consensus
among its parties, NWS and NNWS alike. By underlining that the commitments
in Articles IV and VI are common to all, Sagan rightly rejects a selective read-
ing of the text of the Treaty (“I like this part and that part. . . . But this other
one is not convenient for me; there’s a loophole!”). This is an endeavor that
merits constructive, good-faith answers. Shared responsibility is the right ap-
proach—the only one likely to succeed in maintaining nonproliferation norms,
promoting gradual nuclear disarmament, and making the world safe for nu-
clear energy.
It also merits an honest expression of differences. There is a valid idea be-
hind Sagan’s description of the respective roles of the IAEA Secretariat, IAEA
Board of Governors, and UN Security Council in dealing with noncompliance
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with safeguards agreements. But the choice of words—“this ‘inalienable’ right
is in reality a conditional right”—is unfortunate and maybe misleading. The
word “inalienable” is not in Article IV by chance. It means what it says. It is
part of a careful balance of rights and obligations that—particularly pending
further progress in disarmament—is already considered skewed toward NWS
as it is. Countries that are found in noncompliance with their safeguards
agreements have one obligation: to come back into full compliance and pro-
vide assurances to the international community that they did not acquire, and
are not seeking to acquire, nuclear weapons. This is precisely the purpose of
safeguards: “preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nu-
clear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices” (Article III, section 1).
If Article IV on peaceful uses is “conditional,” Article III on safeguards
would be as well: “The safeguards required by this article shall be implemented
in a manner designed to comply with Article IV of this Treaty, and to avoid
hampering the economic or technological development of the Parties or inter-
national cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities” (Article III,
section 3). In fact, these are not conditions, but parameters that clarify the
purpose behind each commitment in the Treaty. Article IV is not to be abused
in order to conceal development of nuclear explosives. Article III is not to be
abused in order to stifle the development of nonexplosive nuclear applications
in the NNWS. But abusum non tollit usum—the abuse does not take away the
use. One does not restore confidence in the NPT by moving the goal posts. 
It is also not clear that the “NNWS should recognize that entering into
negotiations about international control of the nuclear fuel cycle is an essen-
tial part of their Article VI commitment” because the “NWS will be less likely
to accept deep reductions to zero (or close to zero) if there are more and more
states with latent nuclear-weapons capability because of the spread of uranium
enrichment and plutonium reprocessing technologies.” There are several logi-
cal leaps here. Accepting this argument would mean that the NNWS would
be legally bound to do whatever the NWS feel is proper and useful because if
they don’t, the NWS will be “less likely” to fulfill their Article VI obligations.
Of course, the world would be simpler for the NWS if they, and only they, had
fuel-cycle capabilities. But that was not the deal we all agreed to. 
The main contribution that the NNWS may give to nuclear disarmament,
and the only one that is legally binding, is to refrain from acquiring nuclear
weapons, while adhering to IAEA safeguards, which provide assurances that
they are indeed refraining. Apart from that, there are plenty of things that
everybody could do to make the world a better place and help other states
feel more secure. But there is no legal obligation to commit to this or that
course of action, in particular the internationalization of the nuclear fuel cycle,
about which there is no agreement, either on its feasibility (the NWS them-
selves would not agree to relinquish national control over their fuel facilities,
and any discriminatory regime would be unacceptable), or even in its desir-
ability in principle (one has only to think of the manifold controversies that
SHARED RESPONSIBILITIES, SHARED RIGHTS 43
would spring forth, relating to technological secrecy, industrial development,
energy security, commercial advantage, and even proliferation).
The internationalization of the fuel cycle is an impossible solution in
search of a problem. It derives from an unproven and, in my view, false as-
sumption: that capability breeds proliferation. Instead, it is the other way
around. It is the intent to proliferate that breeds capability. (There are, of
course, other, more legitimate causes that may also breed capability.) This has
been true in the history of nuclear weaponry, especially in the nuclear-armed
states themselves. Nobody is terribly worried, for instance, about the fuel-
cycle capabilities, extant or potential, of countries such as Australia, Belgium,
Canada, or The Netherlands. Their capabilities are large, but they have no co-
gent reason to proliferate. We can therefore be confident of their intent. The
same is true for Argentina, Brazil, and South Africa. But for countries that
had no fuel-cycle capability, once the intent appeared, driven by political and
strategic reasons, the capability was not far behind. It is therefore far better to
address the cause, not the symptom.
This does not mean, and I have expressed this sentiment elsewhere, that
all 192 member states of the United Nations should have nuclear fuel-cycle
facilities. Autonomous control of the nuclear fuel cycle, like most valuable
things in life, carries certain costs and risks, and not all states will want to ac-
cept them. For most states, buying or leasing fuel in a competitive market,
under IAEA safeguards, will be the best option. The more competitive the
market and the more free of political considerations, the better this option
will look. Each new supplier will only help further to clog the market.
These are the two major disagreements that I have with Sagan’s excellent
paper. The general lines of his argument are robust and most of his advice is
sound. He is also quite accurate in pointing out that even in a zero-nuclear-
weapons world, nuclear deterrence would still exist, albeit in a latent, virtual,
nonsalient way. The capability will still be there. If we are lucky and wise, how-
ever, we will learn not to exercise it. 
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There is growing interest worldwide in civilian nuclear power based on the
recognition of its potential for meeting increased energy demands. But the
spread of nuclear technology, in the absence of rigorous safety regimes, pre-
sents unique security risks, including the potential proliferation of weapons
capabilities to new states, sub-national, and terrorist groups.
The Academy’s Global Nuclear Future Initiative is working to prevent this
dangerous outcome by bringing together constituencies that historically have
not communicated effectively—from government policy-makers to heads of
nongovernmental organizations, from nuclear engineers to industry leaders,
from social scientists to nonproliferation experts—to establish an interdiscipli-
nary and international network of experts working together to devise and
implement nuclear policy for the twenty-first century. Our overriding goal is 
to identify and promote measures that will limit the security and proliferation
risks raised by the apparent growing global appetite for nuclear energy.
To help reduce the risks that could result from the global expansion of nuclear
energy, the Initiative addresses a number of key policy areas, including the
international dimension of the nonproliferation regime, the entirety of the fuel
cycle, the physical protection of nuclear facilities and materials, and the inter-
action of the nuclear industry with the nonproliferation community. Each of
these areas has specific challenges and opportunities, but informed and thought-
ful policies for all of them are required for a comprehensive solution. We also
recognize that “game changers,” developments that could have a tremendous
impact but cannot be extrapolated from current trends, could influence the
course of events and should be identified and included in our deliberations.
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